Coll 6/67(6) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar: Trucial Coast Oil Concessions' [‎184v] (375/402)

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, ri^irahle but the frontier question was
whole question, it would have b ® en T P Saud and in these circumstances, and on
evidently a cause of annoyanceJ,o^ ^ re iy geographical aspects of the
account of the difference of ^ would be to endanger
akhsh area, to conversations. In view of His
and to counteract the^goodcJS^t^ ^ tMs sub ject, Ihn Sand might we}’ jel
Majesty’s Government s ^^y^theVof the two areas which he coveted, but cfiat
that he could not hope to ot • , ..wav A.s regards the dangers arising
not the same thing as sigmngjhem away. ^ A^i.ga^ ^ jn ^
was
E. 2124/258/
91 (1937)
from an undetermined frontier His Majesty s mmio i (j overnnlen t ^ purely
Af war if Ibn Sand were hostile to His Majesty s crovenmieui,, <i puiciy
oaner °frentier would not deter him from aggressive action, while if he were
SC an ally or a neutral, he would be unlikely to disturb the quo.
Sir R Bullafd urged therefore that, in order not to let the ^miyfaimsgoby
default a special joint commission should be sent to examine Jn, purely
Graphical'features of the Jebel Nakhsh area. At the same time he urged that
Hi?Majesty’s Government should consider giving Ibn Sand a royalty on any
oil which might be found in or near the Jebel Nakhsh, on the pretext that the
oil-bearing strata must run partly under his territory (though a similar plan
had been found impracticable when Iraq had endeavoured to buy oft ftiiKish
intransigence about Mosul). Finally, he pointed out the strain that would be
placed on Ibn Saud if the search for oil and minerals m Saudi Arabia continued
to be unsuccessful, while oil were found, as in the case of Bahrein, in the territory
of some completely unimportant ruler like the Sheikh of Qatar.
e. 2124 / 258 / 43 . On the 7th May, 1937, the Foreign Office replied that, while the
91(1937) - undesirability of pressing Ibn Saud for a decision was appreciated, an undeter
mined frontier must, in their opinion, constitute a continual source of danger
and uncertainty, particularly since Petroleum Development (Qatar), Limited (a
subsidiary of Petroleum Concessions, Limited, to whom the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company had transferred their Qatar rights on the 5th February, 1937), were
hoping to begin prospecting in the south-western area of the Qatar peninsula.
If nothing were done to effect at least a crystallization of the frontier on lines
which appeared reasonable to His Majesty’s Government, and therefore to fulfil
their obligations to the Arab States on the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , it was always possible
that Ibn Saud would continue to pursue his former tactics and seek to extend his
influence, thereby rendering the possibility of effecting a territorial settlement
increasingly remote, particularly if Anglo-Saudi relations deteriorated as a result
of the imminent publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine.
In the circumstances His Majesty’s Minister was asked whether he advocated
a unilateral declaration by His Majesty’s Government, to be treated, if necessary,
as confidential, defining the line which they regarded as the boundary. It was
suggested that this might be done in an amicably phrased note explaining that,
though His Majesty’s Government appreciated the reasons for Ibn Baud’s
unwillingness to commit himself at this juncture, it was impossible for His
Majesty s Government to allow the question to continue in its present indeter
minate ^state. It was intended that the note, after defining the northern sector
°y ^ ne frontier on the lines of the Riyadh proposals, modified to take account of
the newly defined position of Safaq, should explain that His Majesty’s Govern-
ment did not intend to claim territory either for themselves or for the Arab
kAeikhs in the Fersian Gulf beyond that line; they proposed to treat the territorv
on the Qatar and Abu Dhabi side of the line as either under the control of His
rSfw - 8 T\T Yer . n ™ e n t or the suz , eramt y of the Arab rulers concerned; finally,
. e • ; '' V a J®? y s ovemment desired to record their position in this question
»te&2r » ita *«*
menCof ondrosoS ’ 8 ^ WaS that the P 08 ^^ of an early commenee-
suwested that in order f' 1 ® U S 0 l /j) 3 u ?t , fy the proposed communication, but
Zsf favourable relit rt the pl11 ’ U was ™Portant first to return the
most favourable reply possible to a recent request of Ibn Sand’s for arms
either 1 that h“ uJtltTcflA^ — in m9 atd sa"n|
payment for the arms supplied tte^o^hse^eUe^stflCt^^tt ^ pl ' esent ', f f
overlook the question of eventual ravmentN t’d k 1 ' th 4 tlle y proposed to
about Ibn Sand’s complaints of Ms Maiestv^s Or v 6n * S ?> ld a sympathetic note
ment,” in which an offer should be mm ftls^ ^V - 8 ^ of enclr cle-
His Majesty might care to niooini that d re P resen tative whom
Jebel Dukhan. ' PP0)I,t that the Jebel Na khsh formed part of the