‘Foreign Department Notes. Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf.’ [‎5r] (9/22)

7
We are unanimously and strongly of opinion that, the Arms Conference having failed so
far as India is concerned, vigorous action must be taken in order to cope with a political
movement (for it is nothing else) which has already upset the balance of power on our frontier
and is now a grave obstacle to the maintenance of peace.
Mr. Merk thinks that, whereas hitherto the worse armed tribes have been afraid to co
operate with the better armed tribes, there is now a danger of combination as a result ot
uniform armament with good rifles. In Afghanistan a serious situation is growing up, tor
the people are now armed and the revenues are not coming in. Fiscal pressure might well
precipitate trouble.
The exact number of rifles which are imported into Maskat and exported thence to the
Mekran coast cann-.t be ascertained. The figures of the Intelligence Branch (the best
available) show the following trade paying custom duties:—
Exported to
Year.
Imported into Maskat.
Mekran.
Koweit.
Elsewhere.
1906
40,000
3,175
13,500
1,200
1907
60,000
11,247
14,500
1908
78,825
25,600
(For six months
only.)
5,350
150
Ammunition imported into Maskat.
... 9,300,000
... 14,520,000
... 19,198,900
A considerable business is done by the Sultan's officials sub rosa ; and the destination of
the arms is often wrongly shown.
The price of rifles has already fallen on our frontier more than 50%. Afghanistan and
independent territory are now armed to the teeth. There is abundance of ammunition. At
Kharlachi the other "day an incessant musketry fire was kept up for two days. In the Tirah
campaign the Afridis had not more than 10 or 15 rounds per man.
It is no longer possible to disarm our tribesmen. But action might be taken—
(a) At the Afghan end ;
(b) At the Maskat end;
(c) On the Mekran coast and in Persia.
(a) Last year the Secretary of State suggested that we should regularise the supply of
e 4 . rwrvko. iqcr Knc s 9 *, 230 arms to the Amir. It would be useless to at-
Pro No. 230 in Secret F., October 1908, iNos. . mu a • • i • uu ^ j
Pro. No. 452 in Secret F„ December 1907, Nos. 378- tempt this. The Amir is deep in the trade
484 . ’ himself. He considers that he is within his
lights, and greatly resented our interference with the gun-runners at the Kacha Gorge.
(b) Mr. Holland wishes us to come to some arrangement with the Sultan of Maskat now
or shortly Major Cox gives weighty reasons against such action. I think Mr. Holland
takes an altogether too sanguine view of the probability of the Sultan's working loyally with
us throne is none to secure, and he cannot aSord to alienate powerful interests.
An agreement with the Sultan at this stage would, I think, raise more difficulties than it
would settle and would almost certainly involve trouble with the French, and it might
be ineffectual. The trade could move from Maskat. Arms could be transhipped to dhows
on the high seas I would certainly not advise any reliance on the Sultan, at any rate until
we have shown that we can hinder the trade. We shall then be in a position to make
terms with some reasonable prospect of permanence.
(o) We can expect no help from the Persian authorities. Now that the Russians are
a-arrisonino- Northern Persia, one of the objections to our operating with our troops in Southern
“ . Pr „ K„ B 205 , 206 .Dd 219 in Secret E., FeW, 1’ers.a has boon removed. This was recom-
loot) Nos 188-242. mended* last year by Sir H. McMahon and
Maior Cox. But I do not think that His Majesty's Government would allow us to use troops
on Persian soil at present, and it seems premature to c insider the question. For the next few
weeks may" see fresh developments of the Persian muddle. The country is at present in a
state of chaos and it is not yet clear how order is t > be restored. Possibly in the means
employed to restore order, we may have an instn ment which can be used against the Afghan
gun-runners.