‘Foreign Department Notes. Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf.’ [‎9v] (18/22)

15
(1) Please get clean proof and (2) put up the letter about the logex which I asked for
before. I do not see it. (3) Send duplicates of proof to (a) Commerce and Industry Depart-
ment, and (i) Chief of the Staff’s Division asking (a) if there is any objection to the remarks
about Jask ; (i) if they have any modifications to suggest.
S. H. Butleb,—10-8-09.
Extract from a demi-official letter from Colonel Mallexon to Deputy Secretary (F.), dated the
12th August 1909.
I am desired to ask that, should there be no objection, we may be supplied with the
following
(1) Three copies of the notes on the Maskat arms traffic, so far as they have been printed
at present, and with three copies subsequently of the additional notes on the same subject, and
of the despatch in its final form.
********
I am returning you herewith the draft despatch on the arms traffic. You will see that
our view is that we should place before the Secretary of State the best means of crippling the
trade and let him decide how much of it he will sanction. If this idea be accepted some slight
alteration will be necessary in the wording at the beginning of your paragraph 15, but I have
not thought it necessary to suggest anything in the notes as regards this.
Division of the Chief of the Staff.
I have made a trifling red ink addition on page 2 of the despatch.
I think we may concur in the despatch, with the exception of paragraph 14, which }■
think should be modified. As it stands it practically dismisses the proposal put forward in this
Division to endeavour to capture the arms now stored on the Makran Coast as being outsid 6
the pale of practical politics. I do not think this part of the scheme should be gratuitously
condemned in advance. It would be preferable to put the advantages of such action before
the Secretary of State and leave it to him to say whether it is feasible or not. Moreover, the
draft despatch speaks of military operations on a large scale on the Persian Coast. This
would certainly frighten the India and Foreign Offices, and quite unnecessarily, since, so far
as our information goes, the operations in question need only be on a small scale.
Accordingly, the following, or something to the same effect, is suggested for consider
ation :—
14. “ The possible courses that remain are military action on the Persian Coast, a naval
blockade, or a combination of the two. There can be no doubt in our opinion that, from the
point of view of dealing a severe and perhaps final blow to the arms traffic, combined naval and
military action is desirable. All our more recent information goes to prove that the tactics of
the arms-dealers have changed during the current year in one very important respect. Formerly
it was their custom to await the arrival in Maskat during the winter months of the Afghan
and frontier purchasers. The busy gun-running season was thus the period from January to
April, or thereabouts, mentioned in the despatch of His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-
Chief. The more recent Maskat practice, however, is to ship arms across to the Makran Coast
steadily week by week throughout the summer months. Such arms are then stored by the
Baluch Sardars interested in the traffic on or near the coast pending the arrival of the Afghan
caravans in the winter months. Obviously a future naval blockade, however vigorously
enforced, cannot affect these arms, which by now may number several thousands. Our
military advisers are of opinion that it should be possible, by a sweeping movement over a
zone extending to perhaps 20 miles from the coast, to secure a large number of these stored
weapons with but slight resistance on the part of the Baluch Sardars, and that for this purpose
a small force should suffice. We need hardly point out that such action, if successful, would
have a far-reaching effect on the traffic, which is one of a peculiarly sensitive character inas
much as it is mainly carried on by poor men on borrowed capital. Heavy captures, occurring
at the beginning of the winter arms season, might not improbably have the immediate result
of seriously crippling the trade. We are aware, of course, of the possible political objections to
the landing of Indian troops on the Persian littoral. Your Lordship will be able to say whether
recent events in Northern Persia and the threatened security of our Consulates at Kerman and
elsewhere may not materially have modified the position. In any case we feel it our duty
to state that to ensure the most complete measure of success, some such land action seems
desirable should the political objections to such a course not be insuperable