Coll 6/15 'Syria: Administration. Question of offer of throne to King Feisal of Iraq.' [‎118r] (235/497)

important tribes—the Ruwalla and the Sbaa—shows no signs of abating. The
Bedouins have their own representatives in Parliament. Their very serious
contribution to national prosperity (exports), coupled with their existence as a
permanent source of potential trouble, have continued to constitute a problem
requiring constant vihgance on the part of the mandatory authority.
12. In regard to foreign affairs, the delimitation of the frontiers between
^yria, Iraq, Palestine and Turkey has made good progress, and will shortly be
completed. There are customs conventions in force between Syria and the
neighbouring States according special treatments to goods of local manufacture.
The pilgrimage traffic and inter-tribal movements are governed by a recent
“ convention d’amitie et bon-voisinage ” between the Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The overland desert route between Iraq and Syria is subject to certain
restrictions, mutually agreed upon by the two countries concerned. Extradition
of fugitive offenders is also provided for. The harbouring of political refugees
by certain States bordering on Syria was a source of considerable friction during
the disorders of 1925 and 1926, and bred an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual
antipathy between certain officials of the mandatory Powers concerned. This
feeling has, fortunately, at long last, been dissipated. A frequent interchange of
visits between “ opposite numbers ” cannot fail to have beneficial results.
13. To a much greater extent than in Iraq and Palestine, the maintenance
of order and security is entrusted to the armed forces of the mandatory Pow'er,
the annual cost of which is no less than 300 million francs. Nevertheless, ^reat
strides have been made in the organisation of a locally-recruited army, of which,
however, 50 per cent, of the officers are French. This proportion is gradually
being adjusted, as native officers become available from the local School of
Instruction. There are practically no French rank and file in the French army
of occupation, this material consisting of Senegalese, North Africans and Indo-
Chinese. The general “ tone ” amongst the officers is by no means brilliant.
Jealousy and petty dissensions, based on class-prejudice, are the order of the day.
There is no love lost between officers and civilian officials, and this atmosphere
does not add to the social amenities of life in Syria. Nor does it pass unnoticed
by the Syrians themselves. The air force, though strong in numbers, is stated to
be poorly equipped. At present the “ Syrian ” army is not regarded as capable
of coping single-handed with the requirements of the situation. At some future
date, the price of French-bought security will doubtless form the subject of
painful negotiations.
14. Such appears to be the situation in regard to purely domestic affairs.
There are certain questions of major policy which have a wider implication.
15. The greatest problem which confronts the French—and which is also of
immediate British interest—is the question of Syrian unity. It has two distinct
and inextricable aspects, political and economic. As it must inevitably play a
leading part in the ultimate destiny of the whole Near East, it appears to deserve
particular comment.
16. The eviction of King Feisal from Damascus was the first blow to the
idea of “ Arab Empire.” The reshuffling of the territories under French occupa
tion (not mandate) was a logical sequel which in itself strengthened the case for
watertight compartments—Iraq, Palestine. But whereas Iraq and Palestine are
economic propositions, the geographical expression “ Syria is not. On the other
hand, were the French, at this stage of economic depression in the Greater
Lebanon, to return the seceded territories to Syria, there would not only be an
outcry from the Maronites who invited the French to act as their protector, but
the reduced area of the Lebanon would be incapable of independent economic
existence. It would either become a colossal burden, or, against the wills of the
inhabitants, absorbed into Syria. In either event, the mandate would end in
disastrous failure, and the prestige of all mandatory Powers might well be
impaired.
17. M. Ponsot, in his declarations at Geneva, by no means excluded the
possibilities of ultimate “ unity.” The results of the elections, and the general
trend of public thought since then, would appear to justify the view expressed in
paragraph 11 of Damascus despatch No. 84 of the 3rd November 1931, that a
large mass of the population would welcome a treaty on the basis of the present
Syria, and be content to await the outcome of future events.
18. The question of a general amnesty to political offenders—one of the
Nationalists’ claims which enjoys popular support—may well lead to minor
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