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Coll 6/67(4) 'Boundaries of South Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎110r] (219/843)

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The record is made up of 1 file (420 folios). It was created in 12 Nov 1935-27 Sep 1937. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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I
the independence of the \emen should be maintained. In conclusion, Ibn Saud
declared vehemently that there must be an outbreak in the Yemen—perhaps before
the death of the Imam. In that event, what would the Italians do and what would
be the attitude of His Majesty’s Government?
5. Mr. Rendel replied that His Majesty’s Government fully appreciated the
dangers of the situation in the Yemen. There was no doubt that the Italians
had been, and still are, intriguing actively in that country and would be very
ready to fish in the waters they had helped to trouble. But while the internal
situation was perhaps more dangerous than it had been, he was inclined, for the
following reasons and speaking purely personally, to doubt whether the Italian
danger was now quite as acute as it had been a year ago. In the Rome
understanding of 1927 His Majesty’s Government had made it quite clear, and
the Italians had formally recognised, that His Majesty’s Government regarded
it as “a vital imperial interest that no European Power should establish itself
on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea.” (At this point Sir Reader Bullard gave
King Ibn Saud, for convenience of reference, a copy of an Arabic translation of
the relevant text, which had already been communicated to His Majesty by
Sir Andrew Ryan.) There was, of course, no reason to trust any Italian promises
as such, but it was obvious that, in view of the terms of the Rome understanding,
any attempt by Italy to establish herself in the Yemen would be a direct challenge
to His Majesty’s Government. No doubt Italian hotheads, possibly Italian local
officials, cherished designs on the Yemen. But Italian policy would be directed
from Rome, and present indications suggested that for European reasons, and
in view of British rearmament, Italy was not now anxious to embark on any
conflict with His Majesty’s Government, but was rather seeking to establish
better relations. Even if this view should prove mistaken, he did not think
King Ibn Saud need be seriously disturbed by Italian activities in the Yemen.
Saudi and British interests were closely parallel, and it was difficult to see how
any development which threatened Saudi independence could fail equally to
threaten British interests, so that the probability was that, in any such event.
Ibn Saud would, in any case, find Great Britain at his side. At a later interview
the opportunity was taken to mention that the Italians themselves seemed
anxious to keep the Rome understanding alive, and apparently feared a forward
policy on the part of His Majesty’s Government (see Foreign Office despatch to
Jedda, No. 182 of the 24th February).
6. Mr. Rendel added that he understood (from Sheikh Hafiz Wahba) that
His Majesty wished to know the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards
his suggestion for an exchange of information about the Yemen, &c. Mr. Rendel
saw no reason why this should not be possible. His Majesty’s Government would
be glad to pass on to Ibn Saud any information of interest which they could
properly communicate to him. though in doing this they would, of course, be
assuming that Ibn Saud was satisfied that there would be no risk of leakage at
the Saudi end.
7. Ibn Saud then turned to Iraq. He had good information, for people
wrote to him from all parts of the Arab world and he had seen many Iraqi
pilgrims, and the reports all tallied with each other. Everyone was suspicious
of the new Iraqi Government and regarded it as not Arab. There had been much
to be said against Yasin-al-Hashimi, who had even gone so far as to ask Sheikh
Yusuf Yasin to tell Ibn Saud to beware of the British Government, but at least
his policy was an Arab policy. To the policy of the present Iraqi Government
there were two objections : it was communistic, and it was under Turkish
influence. The Turks had begun by trying to get possession of the Sanjak of
Alexandretta, and their next aim would be to acquire Mosul.
8. Mr. Rendel said that the title of Communist was sometimes misapplied
to anyone who favoured economic social reform. He understood that such
reforms were long overdue in Iraq, where there was much extreme poverty, and
it was possible that Hikmet Suleiman’s legislation was necessary, and was not
imposed in any spirit of communism. It might be well, therefore, to reserve
judgment on this point until the Amir Saud and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba should
have seen the situation for themselves during their impending visit to Bagdad.
(Here Ibn Saud said that Hikmet Suleiman did not care a rap for the poor or
for anyone.) As to Turkish influence, Mr. Rendel believed that, while the maker
of the military coup d'Etat, Bakr Sidqi, and some of his military associates, might
be described as pro-Turkish, Hikmet Suleiman showed signs of wanting to shake
[981 m—5] b 2

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Content

This file primarily concerns British policy regarding the eastern and south-eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia, specifically those bordering Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat (i.e. the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman).

Much of the correspondence relates to British concerns that the boundaries should be demarcated prior to the commencement of any oil prospecting in the area. The file's principal correspondents are the following: His Majesty's Minister at Jedda (Sir Andrew Ryan, succeeded by Sir Reader William Bullard); the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (Lieutenant-Colonel Trenchard Craven William Fowle); the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Bahrain (Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Gordon Loch); the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Muscat (Major Ralph Ponsonby Watts); the Secretary of State for the Colonies; the Secretary of State for India; the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; officials of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , and the Admiralty.

Matters discussed in the correspondence include the following:

  • Whether the British should press King Ibn Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] for a settlement of the outstanding questions relating to the aforementioned boundaries.
  • Sir Andrew Ryan's meeting with Ibn Saud and the Deputy Minister for Saudi Foreign Affairs, Fuad Bey Hamza, in Riyadh, in November 1935.
  • The disputed territories of Jebel Naksh [Khashm an Nakhsh, Qatar] and Khor-al-Odeid [Khawr al ‘Udayd].
  • Whether or not a territorial agreement between Ibn Saud and Qatar was concluded prior to the Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916.
  • The intentions of Petroleum Concessions Limited regarding the development of its oil concession in Qatar.
  • The line proposed by the British for the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate.
  • The Kuwait blockade.
  • Leading personalities in Oman.
  • Details of Harry St John Bridger Philby's expedition to Shabwa [Shabwah, Yemen].
  • Four meetings held between Sir Reader Bullard, George Rendel (Head of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department), and Ibn Saud, in Jedda, 20-22 March 1937.

Also included are the following:

The file includes a divider which gives a list of correspondence references contained in the file by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence (folio 2).

Extent and format
1 file (420 folios)
Arrangement

The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the file.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the inside front cover with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 421; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. A previous foliation sequence, which is also circled, has been superseded and therefore crossed out.

Written in
English in Latin script
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Coll 6/67(4) 'Boundaries of South Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎110r] (219/843), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/2137, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100049619516.0x000016> [accessed 28 March 2024]

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