Coll 30/21 'Persian Gulf: Koweit. Blockade by Ibn Saud. Koweit-Nejd Relations' [‎195r] (400/1142)

be dependent on those untrustworthy imperialists, when you might
depend, without being exactly dependent, on a man like me, old mend,
fellow Moslem, fellow Arab and the one big independent man m
Arabic! ?
lb) “I don’t like squeezing you, I really don’t, with that embargo. As
things are at present, I have to think of my own interests. But it
your interests were mine, we could easily have an understanding,
sort of ‘ Zollverein’ as they say; same duties levied in our ports; tree
competition between yours and mine; free trade over our land border.
What have the English done about it ? Nothing; because they cannot
get at me. c Sois mon frere et je te fais vivre. Sois le leur et ]e
te tue
(c) “I should not mop you up, of course. You would rule your State under
an understanding with me. Indeed, if you were in with 1 m ^h
recognise a sort of influence of yours over those three Lost tribes tiiat
you always want back. Look at how I treated the Idnsi. I made a
sensible agreement with him in 1926. He remained a ruler with
tribal influence. I did not take charge in his country, until he got
into such a mess that he asked me to in 1930. I did not hit him on
the head until the poor mutt thought he could try conclusions with
me in 1932. He looked to foreigners and he got it m the neck
from 7 fh@
id) c ‘ You have had trouble with Iraq over your property there. What has
England been able or even willing to do for you? If I had the rig
to protect you against third parties, you would find that I knew how
to see you through.
(e) “ Then there’s oil. People are after it in my country, and m yours, and
in the Neutral Zone. Why not have an agreed policy and present
a common front to the West? You know what the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company is. Another name for the British Government, as we saw
in Persia the other day, even if we had not known it before. Take
my tip and keep them'out at all costs. Play about with Holmes, if
you like But don’t trust him, and remember that m the long run
your best policy would be to deal, like me, direct with American
interests, using the others to put up the price.
6 It is easy enough to detect fallacies in the; above imaginary address. I
o not know enough about the Sheikh of Koweit to judge what his reaction to
- would be, but many an Arab, not well pleased with British protectors, mig
nd it convincing enough to be attracted into Ibn Sand s parlour.
7 I wrote the above notes in Jedda at the end of June. I thought them too
ypothetical at that time to submit them for official consideration. They may
LOW ever be worthy of some attention now that the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. and I are
, 0 th in this country, and Colonel Dickson will soon be available for consultation,
ixcept that Ibn Saud continues to show a marked anxiety to avoid all compil
ations I see no material reason to modify what I wrote nearly three months ago,
ubiect always to the consideration that I merely suggest an uncertain working
heory to be tested by further examination and by keeping a close watch on
‘uture developments.
August 16, 1933.
Appendix B.
Note.
Obligations of His Majesty’s Government towards the Sheikh of Koweit.
(A )—Nature of the Undertakings given.
Bv the agreement of the 23rd January, 1899, His Majesty’s Government
assured the Sheikh “of the good offices of the British Government
wards 7 you your heirs and successors, so long as you, your heirs and successors