Coll 6/10 'Hejaz-Nejd Affairs: Financial Situation and Internal Situation' [‎35r] (76/1310)

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Pt 1 - C,y f U ? t p he Was Sure 1 A t reasonable, and he did not wish to embarrass
s Majesty s Government. And besides, if the holding of a conference had been
the course to pursue, he would have proposed it himself and not followed the
< ^ suggestions of others.
at • > ^n Te the King r 1 e 1 vealed a gain a secondary anxietv, viz., that His
Majesty s Government would come to some arrangement about Palestine with
someone else in the Arab world, or come to some fresh decision without his
knowledge, and thus damage his prestige irretrievably. There was. he said, a story
going about to which many were giving credence, that His Majesty’s Government
pioposed to declare a cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine and to hand
the country over to the Iraq Government, who would then, as part of the bargain,
open Palestine to unrestricted immigration by Jews. He said that he had always
been frank with His Majesty’s Government, and he hoped they would always be
frank with him. I described the scheme he had mentioned as fantastic in itself
and incredible for two other reasons. In the first place partition was still the
declared policy of His Majesty’s Government, though, of course, no one could
foresee what the recommendations of the forthcoming commission would be, and
in the second, His Majesty’s Government appreciated the complete frankness and
sincerity with which His Majesty had always acted in the matter of Palestine,
and I was sure they would never take any serious decision on the subject without
giving him the earliest possible notice.
11. I bn Sand said he wished that some policy could be found which would
not place His Majesty's Government in opposition to the Arabs. The one question
of Palestine apart, the interests of His Majesty’s Government and the Arabs were
identical, but the Arabs found themselves facing the Jews, whom they could easily
deal with as Jews alone, and behind the Jews they found the British, and conflict
was inevitable. The Arabs knew well and execrated the treatment of the Arabs
in Libya by the Italians both before and after the war, and no one could have
believed a year ago to what extent Mussolini would induce the Arabs to look upon
him as their champion. His success was entirely due to the British policy in
Palestine
12. At the time of the interview I had not received the instructions conveyed
in your telegram No. 110 , dated the 15th December, which arrived after Ibn Sand
had left Jedda, but, as will be seen from what I have said. I anticipated your
assurance that there was nothing fresh to say, and that, if there was. he would
he told as soon as possible. I also anticipated your message about the necessity
for mutual comprehension of each other’s difficulties by the two Governments.
I asked His Majesty whether he had not found, as he rose from being ruler of
Riyadh to his present high position, that at every stage the points of contact with
the world increased and political questions became more complicated, and when
the King said that this was so, I asked whether he could not believe that the
affairs of Great Britain, coming as she did into touch with many countries which
did not concern Saudi Arabia seriously and having possessions all over the world,
were even more complicated than His Majesty’s. Ibn Saud pondered a moment
as though the matter had not struck him in that light before and said that he
agreed, and I hope that the argument helped to convince him of the truth of my
assurance, that it was not from failure to give careful attention to his proposals
that His Majesty's Government had not been able to decide upon a policy more
satisfactory from his point of view.
13. The matters other than politics which were touched upon at the interview
are dealt with in my despatch No. 182, dated the 18th December. Throughout the
interview Ibn Saud showed the friendliness and desire to co-operate with His
Majesty’s Government wdiich were shown during the talks in March last when
Mr. Rendel was here.
14. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the High
Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , His Majesty’s Ambassadors at
Cairo and Bagdad, his Excellency the Governor of Aden and the Hon. the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , Bushire.
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.