Coll 6/36(2) 'Nejd-Transjordanian Frontier Affairs' [‎301v] (609/996)

he would be arriving quite soon. I agreed that it would be reasonable to await
him Presently, 1 discovered a larger lly in the ointment, the King had said
m his~telegram that he would wish not only to consult his son, but also to exchange
views on certain undefined preliminary points with His Majesty's Government.
I exerted myself to show that this would merely complicate the matter. I pointed
out that we were now only concerned with a promising approach to the questions
which would need discussion later. The sheikh promised to go into the matter
fully with the King, with whom he had so far only exchanged short telegrams.
In order to reinforce what I had said, I asked his permission to give him a purely
personal statement of a general kind. I had begun to think seriously, I said, of
the possibility of a settlement between Hejaz Kejd and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan when the
very difficult task of a settlement between Hejaz-Nejd and Iraq had been
completed in the spring of last year. I did not then know what the views of
Ibn Saud would be, but when the Hejazi Government had first expressed a wish
for a similar settlement with Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan last autumn, I had considered the
matter further, had seen the difficulties and had concluded that such a settlement
should be regarded as a definite objective though it might take time. The visit
of the Hejazi mission to London had given the matter a new impetus. The Ibn
Rifada affair had given it a further impetus, because, while His Majesty’s
Government had insfsted that it was independent of the immediate issues created
bv that affair it had intensified the study which had been promised in London.
^ 5 I added that the Ibn Rifada affair had also had a disadvantage. It had
caused the Hejazi Government to press very hard a question of responsibility,
with special reference to the Amir Abdullah. I had told Sheikh Yussuf Yasin
and I told him again that in my opinion insistence on the question of responsi
bility miMit prejudice the chances of a general settlement. If two rulers (and the
Amir was a ruler, though not so great a one as Ibn Saud or his brother Feisal)
were to be brought together, it was a very bad beginning for one of them to bring
accusations, however justified he might himself consider them, against the other.
In any case, I thought that a pursuit of the question of responsibilities would
lead nowhere, if only because every public act of the Amir Abdullah throughout
the Ibn Rifada business had been eminently correct and because there were many
people who might like to upset the present regime in this country without wanting
to bring the shereefs back to it. . ,
6 Sheikh Yussuf Yasin listened with great care, thanked me and promised
to lay all I had said before the King. I realise that in discussing all the elements
in the question, viz., the difficulties in the way of a treaty settlement between
Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , the question of responsibility for recent events and
the reasons for supporting King FeisaTs suggestion, I have gone a long way
beyond my instructions and that, even when careful to express personal views only,
I may be taken to be interpreting the mind of His Majesty’s Government. I am
convinced that the use of such language as I have employed affords the best means
of overcoming Hejazi suspicion and of influencing Ibn Baud in the only way in
which I can at present influence him, i.e., through Sheikh Yussuf. My recen
intimacy with the latter has been of distinct advantage, not that he is always easy
to handle, but because he has a simpler nature than that of Fuad Bey and is more
completely in the King’s confidence. For these reasons I ask your indulgence, i
I should seem to have talked too much or too openly. . > tt h
7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty s mg
Commissioners at Jerusalem, Bagdad and Cairo.
I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.