File 53/1915 Pt 5 'German War: Turkey; Arab Kingdom; the Petrograd negotiations' [‎142r] (288/436)

coasts are purely Arab Provinces and there is no difference between a
■ L a Pl 11 Aral); they are botli descendants of one forefather.
( ; Alosleins will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful —
< Mn.u ibn Khattab and other Caliphs succeeding him, who ordained in the
laws of the Moslem faith that Moslems should treat the Christians as they
tieat themselves, lie, Omar, declared with reference to Christians, “they
will have the same privileges and submit to the same duties as ourselves.”
they will thus enjoy their civic rights in as much as it accords with the
general interest of the whole nation.
(_.; As the ! rovinces of Irak are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom and
weie m fact the seat of its Governments in the time of Ali Ibn Abu Talib,
and in the time of all Caliphs who succeeded him ; and as m them began
the civilization of the Arabs, and as their towns in those provinces were the
first towns built in Islam where the Arab power became so great; therefore
these provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs far and near, and their
traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently, we cannot satisfy
the Arab nations or make them submit to give up such a title to nobility.
But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the
assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard
our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all
these reasons we might agree to leave under the British Administration for
a short time those districts now occupied by the British troops, without the
rights of either party being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab
nation, which interests are to it economic andvital) and against a suitable
sum paid as compensation to the Arab kingdom for the period of occupation,
in order to meet the expenses which every new kingdom is bound to
support, at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of
those districts, and especially those which are essential.
(3.) In your desire to hasten the movement we see not only advantages
but grounds of apprehension.
The first of these grounds is the fear of the blame of the Moslems of the
opposite party (as lias already happened in the past) who would declare that
we have revolted against Islam and ruined its forces. The second is that
standing in the face of Turkey, which is supported by all the forces of
Germany, we do not know what Great Britain and her Allies would do if
one of t he Fntente Powers were weakened and obliged to make peace. We
fear that the Arab nation will then he left alone in the face of Turkey
together with her Allies, but we would not at all mind if we were to face
O '
the Turks alone. Therefore it is necessary to take these points into
consideration in order to avoid a peace being concluded in which the parties
concerned may decide the fate of our people as if we had taken part in the
war without making good our claims to official consideration.
(4.) The Arab nation has a strong belief that after this war is over, the
Turks under German influence will direct their efforts to provoke the Arabs
and violate their rights, both material and moral, to wipe out their nobility
and honour and reduce them to utter submission as they are determined to
ruin them entirely. The reasons for the slowness shown in our action have
already been stated.
(5T When the Arabs know that the Government of Great Britain is their
Allv who will not leave them to themselves at the conclusion of peace in the
face of Turkey and Germany, and that she will support and will effectively
defend them, then to enter the war at once will, no doubt, be in conformity
with the general interest of the Arabs.
(0.) Our letter dated -9th Shawal 1333 (9th September 1915) saves us the
trouble of repeating our opinions as to Articles 3 and 4 of your honoured
last letter regarding administration, Government advisers and officials,
especially as you have declared, 0, Fxalted Minister! that you will not
interfere with internal affairs.
(7.) The arrival of a clear and definite answer as soon as possible, to the
above proposals, is expected. We have done our utmost in making con
cessions in order to come to an agreement satisfying both parties. We know