PZ 5636/35 'Egypt: Annual Reports 1934 -1938' [‎17r] (40/342)

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protected storage, &c. The September crisis demonstrated at once the short
comings of the Egyptian army, which were to be expected, and a genuine desire to
co-operate with the British army. This was gratifying, as showing that, in a real
emergency, the Egyptians could be relied upon to the limit of their training and
equipment.
53. The most important step forward during the year was the acceptance
by the Ministry of War of a five-year plan for the expansion of the army to one
mobile and one infantry division, one anti-aircraft division, one reserve division,
one coast defence group, and the Sudan contingent. But, although this proposal
was accepted, its execution continued to be dependent upon a number of reforms
which successive Ministers had lacked the courage to carry through. The chief
obstacles encountered by the mission in their efforts to train the Egyptian army
lay in the following directions :—
(a) The Organisation of the War Ministry .—As constituted it had shown
itself incapable of initiating or executing any comprehensive scheme
of expansion. This fact was recognised by Hassan Sabry Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , and a
detailed scheme for the reorganisation of the ministry was under
consideration at the end of the year.
(b) Recruiting .—A new recruiting law, approved by the Egyptian Govern
ment, was drafted without the advice of the military mission. It
proved to fall short of remedying all the shortcomings of the existing
law. While it reduced the period of colour service for conscripts from
five to three years and abolished exemption by purchase, it offered no
inducement to non-commissioned officers to remain in the army after
their period of conscript service was finished. Nor was any proper
provision made for building up the cadre of trained technical
personnel (“ tradesmen ”) essential to a modern army.
(c) Provision of Officers . —While recognising the necessity for increasing the
number of officers in the army and raising their status, the Govern
ment did nothing effective to render the army more attractive to the
general public as a career. A crisis was produced in December when
the Government attempted to apply to the army the conditions
obtaining in the civil service. This was an ill-considered move and led
to the resignation of Hassan Sabry Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. early in 1939.
(d) Administrative Services .—These were still far behind the fighting
services in efficiency, owing to the fact that, until August 1938, the
War Ministry refused to accept the services of a British officer to
advise them in such matters.
(e) Buildings .—The building programme was also considerably beh ind require
ments, the chief sufferers being the Royal Egyptian Air Force and the
various training establishments.
54. Maior-General J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., MH., left
?£VPt on the 23rd October on promotion, and was succeeded by Major-General
5 N. Macready, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., as chief of the military mission
During the year the mission was expanded to a total of thirty-eight officeis and
orty-one warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, including the Royal Air
?orce personnel attached to the Egyptian air force. Nevertheless, it was clear at
he end of the year that if real progress were to be made it would he necessary to
idd very considerably to the numbers of the mission engaged in the supervision
>f training.
’yptian Air Force. . .
55 Training developed satisfactorily under the guidance of the air .section
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