File 1110/1916 Pt 2 'Persia: SITUATION Miscellaneous' [‎89r] (182/276)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.!
PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
1998
[ 86316 ]
916
[May 6.]
Section 1,
Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)
511)
(No. 36. Confidential.)
Sir, i Tehran, March 24, 1916.
WHEN concluding my despatch No. 157 of December last, I contemplated giving
a separate report on the impending negotiations for a treaty of alliance, but so little
progress has been made with those discussions that, although the suggestion of alliance
has been by no means without effect on the political events in this country, they can,
I think, be sufficiently dealt with in the general sketch of events down to the fall of
Farman Farma’s Cabinet which I have now the honour to submit.
As you will remember, the reconstructed Mustofi Cabinet came into existence
under a pledge to put into practice a policy of actively benevolent neutrality to us, and,
after a certain amount of coaxing from us, eventually made the formal proposal for a
treaty of alliance. The proposal was, however, scarcely made before Mustofi-ul-
Mamalik, worked on, no doubt, by the Turkish and Austrian representatives and,
probably with more effect, by such personages as Moin-ul-Vizareh, Hakim-ul-Mulk,
Mukhbir-es-Sultaneh, and Sbahab-ed-Dowleh, took fright at his own temerity and
withdrew it, and this on the eve of the day on which he had promised to communicate
to us the terms of his proposals. We have been told more than once that Mustofi. was
all along playing us false, but I cannot accept this view, and I feel that his conduct on
this occasion was only another if crowning instance. of his incurable indecision and
vacillat on. Almost from the very day of its formation Mustofi’s Cabinet had been
unsatisfactory. Farman Farma, it is true, did what he could at the Ministry of
Interior and succeeded by the vigour of his messages to the provinces, especially in the
south, in inducing a good many important personages, who appeared, to have been
seduced by German gold and promises, to pause before definitely committing themselves.
But his efforts were hampered by unwilling colleagues, and on more than one occasion,
as for instance when Darya Beggi requested that the Minister of Interior s telegrams
should be signed by the Prime Minister and Sipahdar so as to give them additional
weight, the latter would not support him. In Tehran itself where the Government
was virtually under the protection of Russian bayonets, the inactivity of the Cabinet
was deplorable. Mustofi could not even bring himself to dismiss Colonel Edwail, the
commandant of the gendarmerie, and Major Frick of the Second Regiment, and peemed
to think that he had exhibited extraordinary courage in ordering the dismissal of
Maior de Mare and the other Swedish officers who had openly taken active part with
the Germans in Western Persia. Still less would he get rid of the Democrat members
of his Cabinet, such as Hakim-ul-Mulk and Mustashar-ed-Dowleh, the latter of whom
as Minister of Telegraphs was well known to be still assisting the Germans 3y giving
information as to the movement of Russian troops and spreading false reports of defeats
inflicted on them. Sipahdar’s waywardness and unreasonable demands for money
wherewith to construct the Persian army of his dreams also troubled the harmony o
the Council. Mustofi himself did nothing at all, professing that his time was occupied
in preparing the Persian draft for the treaty of alliance and endeavouring to reconcile
pu ytt," «*»— !*-«-• ,h s ft IS-
alliance must have been exceedingly distasteful and only the convmtaon that hostihty
to Russia and her Ally spelt ruin to Persia can have compelled him to ad°Pt th at policy
We may take it as certain, however, that his innate Russophobia made him an e y
prey to suggestions that, after all, he had made a mistake as to Russra’e power to take
military measures in this country, and that a Turkish army of formidable n e re-
under the leadership of Marshal von der Goltz Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , was at hand to drive t e y
out. In such circumstances, to conclude the alliance was onl y N™ s Nfiment of
the war on the locally weaker side, but was to do so against the religious se
the country. Again, the circumstantial stories industriously set * “A’b DowJeh
defection to the Turco-German cause of such important chieftains as Soulat^d-I)
the Yali of Pushti Kuh, Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and even the Sheikh of Mohamme
[2579 /—l]