File 2764/1904 Pt 4 'Baghdad Railway: Anglo-Turkish negotiations; proposals of Turkish Govt; status of Kowait' [‎73r] (150/674)

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 20th March 1912.
L rivate. Baghdad Railway. Informal discussion with Turkish delegates
has begun. As regards Section 2 of British memorandum of 29th July 1911,
they seem to think they can meet us except as to Katr, where withdrawal of
military post would be regarded by Turkish Parliament as unjustifiable
cession of territory. I hey ask whether consolidation of Turkish authority
there cannot be reconciled with our interests, such as suppression of arms
tiaffic, protection of pearl fisheries, and Sheikh of Bahrein’s pasturage rights,
and combined with exercise ot our maritime supervision where necessary.
There seems force in their argument about Parliament, and I should like
to know if you think exclusion of 1 urks from Katr is worth sacrifice of any
material parts of our other claims. All the ground has not yet been covered,
but if agreement can be reached on all other points, would you accept
this compromise provided that 1 urks bind themselves either to suppress
arms traffic themselves or, failing that, to allow us to do so? And what
conditions would you suggest to secure our interests above mentioned ?
Please reply as soon as possible.
From Viceroy, 20th March 1912.
Private. Your private telegram of 20th instant. Any settlement which
tends to consolidate position of Turkey in the Gulf will in my opinion leave
much to be desired. Our refusal to recognise locus standi of Turkey in
Katr has hitherto prevented the exercise of any jurisdiction and the small
military post at El Bidaa have been practically prisoners. Our specific
recognition of their suzerainty in Katr will enable Turks to consolidate their
position both on the coast and in the hinterland from the limits of Koweit
down to Odeid. It will give them for the first time foothold in Gulf
with many potential possibilities and will open up question of joint
intervention with us in Gulf affairs. I do not see how this can be
reconciled with our interests, whether it be in suppression of arms traffic,
protection of pearl fisheries, or the combined exercise of maritime supervision.
Nothing but serious prejudice to our interests in the Gulf seems likely to
result from such a development. The memorandum of 29th July represents
irreducible minimum to our pledge (?), and I can find nothing which we can
surrender with safety.
If it is merely a dislike to the withdrawal of the garrison of El Bidaa
which forms present obstacle in discussion, it might perhaps be possible to
safeguard Turkish amour propre by allowing present nominal garrison to
stay there on condition that no Turkish jurisdiction is exercised in Katr
outside El Bidaa, and that we are allowed to suppress arms traffic there.
From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 25th May 1912.
Private. My foreign secret telegram of 14th instant and your private
telegrams -of 29th April 1911 and 16th July 1911. Bagdad Railway. I am
strongly inclined to think that Turkish counter-proposal should be used as
opportunity for getting rid of French and Russian participation and returning
to our original idea of 50 per cent, for ourselves and the remaindei divided
between Turkey and Germany. 1 have never believed that 60 per cent,
divided between France, Russia, and ourselves, even if backed by an
international convention, is equivalent, for purpose of defence against
differential rates, to 50 per cent, for ourselves alone, and there would surely
be great loss of prestige if we were reduced to so small a share. More
over our dependence on the two other Powers here might eventually be a
source of weakness elsewhere. I should be glad to have your definite
opinion as to relative advantages of the two proposals as soon as possible.