File 2764/1904 Pt 4 'Baghdad Railway: Anglo-Turkish negotiations; proposals of Turkish Govt; status of Kowait' [‎83r] (170/674)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ThisDocumentJs the property of the Secretary of State for India in Council.
P. 1858. (Immediate.)
Sir,
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
21st May 1912.
. 1 am dire(, ted by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the
receipt of your letter, No. 16,000, of the 16th instant, on the subject of the
-Bagdad Railway and connected questions.
In reply I am to say that if, after the very full discussions that have
already taken place, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considers that
a urther interdepartmental conference is necessary, the Marquess of Crewe
wi depute a representative of this Office to attend it. But, personally, he
considers it sufficiently established that, regard being had to the magnitude
of ntish interests involved, this country cannot with dignity, or indeed with
safety, agree to participate on a basis of less than 50 per cent., and he has
always regarded the distribution of 60 per cent, between Great Britain,
France, and Russia (or between the first two alone) as a wholly unacceptable,
and even dangerous, alternative. Further, he holds very strongly the view
of his predecessor (see paragraph 9 of Sir R. Ritchie’s letter of the 29th
March. 1911) that a friendly agreement with Germany is an essential
preliminary to a satisfactory settlement, and I am to suggest that the Bagdad
Railway Company and the German Government should at once be approached
with a view to such a modification of the declaration of 7 th March 1911 as
would enable this country to participate in the Bagdad-Basra branch to an
extent more nearly proportionate to our commercial interests in that region.
As regards FI Katr I am to say that in Lord Crewe’s opinion an entirely
new situation would be created in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and one m everv way
detrimental to British interests, if the Turks were allowed to consolidate
themselves there. Such consolidation is indeed contradictory of the main
object of His Majesty’s Government in attempting a settlement of questions
in the Gulf, which was to eliminate Turkish influence as far as possible, and
in any case to limit it to the head of the Gulf. That influence in El Hasa
has existed only since Midhat Pasha’s expedition in 1871, and may be said
to exist at present on sufferance, for so long as the quasi-independence of
Koweit is maintained, El Hasa must remain more or less isolated. But the
construction of the Bagdad Railway to Basra or Koweit will undoubtedly
enable the Turkish Government to make their authority much more effective ;
and the further result of allowing, under the sanction of a Convention, the
consolidation of Turkish power in the peninsula of El Katr will, His Lordship
thinks, be not only to enable the Turkish Government to extend and establish
it in the interior, but also to give them a secure and recognised point d'appui
within the British sphere of interest. The position of Bahrein—-as a kind of
British enclave in Turkish territory—will be anomalous and precarious,
while the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. will become the scene of constant intrigues requiring
increased vigilance—and therefore increased expenditure on the part of
His Majesty’s Government to check it. Moreover, the Turkish desire to
The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.