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File 1110/1916 Pt 3 'German War: Persia' [‎58v] (121/354)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (173 folios). It was created in 1916. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers.

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Reasons for the suggested punishment.
The need for extensive, radical measures in suppressing lawlessness in
Tangistan must seem plain from the summary given above. The Persian Gov
ernment are not, and will not be for years, in a position to command the
means of restoring order there : they have no regular troops; and tribal chief
tains with shadowy power like Soulet-ud-Douleh, whose winter encampments
lie many miles across the mountain ranges, could not under the most favour
able circumstances get their tribesmen to suppress in an effective manner a
district of the plains of the coast. The coastal tribesmen in their own districts
are fully a match for the Qashqai: a few raids, and villages looted, and then
the Qashqais would be tired, and bought off by bribes: the Tangistanis would
return from the coast hills, and the position would be no better than before.
A Qashqai force too, of any size, would only be procurable between the months
of November and March. The Governor of Bushire could collect a force of the
loyal districts, which have been friendly to the British throughout the rebel
lion, and would be only too glad to see their Tangistani enemies severely
punished. But for the Governor to be able to collect such a force, and march
them into Tangistan, His Majesty’s Government would have to supply—
(i) Field guns, machine guns and ammunition.
(n) British troops to work these guns.
{iii) Mofiey to pay for the wages of the men employed and provisions
for the force.
Guns are essential, because it is impossible for Persian tribesmen armed with
rifles only to capture thick stone or mud forts, well defended by other tribes
men. Guns are the one arm that Persian tribesmen fear.
Moreover, previous experience of Persian Government expeditions makes
it certain that even with a properly equipped force, only half-measures would
result: a Persian Governor, like the Darya Begi, is incapable of doing such a
task thoroughly: the tribesmen, whom he might lead, would have no con
fidence in him. They have insisted for months past on their readiness and
desne to maich, and settle with the situation once and for all, but in co-opera
tion with any British movement.
Further prolongation of the present unsatisfactory situation will prove
most deleterious, both for the Persian and British Governments. All in this
part of Persia are well aware that the force at the command of the rebel chiefs
when unattacked as at present, does not exceed 300 Tangistanis, and some
200 Chahkutahis and Gendarmes : while it is equally well known that if
attacked by a force from Bushire, many of these men, who are now serving
under compulsion or for wages and are bound by no ties to the rebel chiefs
would desert them, and scatter. *
. To , kee P, a force of some 2,000 well-armed British troops on the defensive
in the face ot such an insignificant enemy for months together, when it would
be easy to deal with them, seems not only waste of men ; it makes the rebel
tribesmen think we are afraid of them, and has conveved the worst possible
impression of timourousness on the part of the British force throughout all
Fars, and all the shores of the Gulf. °
The rebel chiefs realise that they committed themselves from the dav
when they began attacks against us and are outlaws : they will continue to
maintain men under arms, and to treat Bushire as an enemy district as Ion 2
as they see us maintain so large a force there. In the meantime they have
ull scope for intrigue, m the hope of setting themselves right with their
own Government, inconsistent at all times : and they can play on our feelings
by using their treatment of their British captives, and their desire for release
as a bait. 9
. The continuance of the present state damages Persian interests, as it is
obviously impossible to allow passage along the caravan routes from up-
country, which traverse the hostile districts and then cross our outpost lines.
VV e cannot afford to have any of the enemy inside Bushire Island, especially
a night. and tor several reasons it would be impossible to prevent this if
tbecaravan routes were thrown open. The result means the stoppage of trade
With the interior, and severe loss to the Customs.

About this item

Content

The volume comprises telegrams, despatches, correspondence, memoranda, and notes, on miscellaneous topics relating to Persia, April to June 1916.

The discussion in the volume includes the following topics:

  • Decoration for the Persian Foreign Minister and Farman Farma for his military support of the British
  • Turkish advance and defeat on Kermanshah road
  • the Russian defeat and withdrawal towards Hamadan
  • the Russian advance on and defeat at Khanikin.

The volume contains correspondence between: the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf Historically used by the British to refer to the sea area between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Often referred to as The Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. ; HBM Minister, Tehran; the Viceroy; and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London.

The volume includes a divider which gives the subject number, the year the subject file was opened, the subject heading, and a list of correspondence references by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.

Extent and format
1 volume (173 folios)
Arrangement

The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the volume.

The subject 1110 (Persia) consists of three volumes, IOR/L/PS/10/590-592. The volumes are divided into three parts, with each part comprising one volume.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the inside front cover with 1, and terminates at the inside back cover with 175; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio.

Written in
English in Latin script
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File 1110/1916 Pt 3 'German War: Persia' [‎58v] (121/354), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/592, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100055634097.0x00007a> [accessed 11 December 2019]

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