File 53/1915 Pt 6 'The War: Arab Kingdom; Italian claims' [‎119v] (243/360)

formal partition will arise, and we earnestly hope that this may he so, for
of formal partition ’ uion of actua l partition, inyolving as it would a
ve can only regard tl e p p ^ .a .i-x- obligations and expenditure, with
very serious increase ,n 0 U ”f. S P^ b ^ 0 ’ u f Sr p artition^te future of
grave misapprehension. But eten w tHout actu one which wa
lelltofar the 6 ’pre^nt 8 moment it is impossible to form any final opinion.
sr irare
mg in our deman s. P course, the fact that within her own
:rn e eClwinl S bab7y e ercise w^ate^er w’e may say, an even stricter
administrative control than heretofore and this will Officer
rStlmimiS SHnar = ^ ^ l^of
It would ° b ^"fy p ^ ia U n nd X b whfic neighbouring Russian sphere was
well-ordered and peacrfuT. Such a condition would only lead to friction
a i fflnnHv Wft do not suo-gest however by this any attempt at direct
administration'. Our tim t thf immediate future should be to assist the
Pe“an Government so far as possible themselves to establish a reasonably
effective administration in Southern Persia. To this end the South Per i
TUfles have been created. The estent of our interference w ith the actual
administration must depend upon the extent to which the Persian Govern
ment appear capable of improved administration, but, generally speaking,
“„ce we have restored a modicum of peace and order in the main trade
centres and on the main trade routes and re-established commercial
facilities we should he content merely to advise as regards the actual
administration of the country itself. This may appear somewhat a make-shift
arrangement, but short of actual partition it appears to be the only course
feasible.
As regards the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , we assume that if the present neutral zone
falls to us,°aU Russian claims in the Persian littoral will be ipso facto finally
extinguished. It might be desirable perhaps to get this definitely stated.
Phis somewhat v agueadmission by Russia referred to in Sir E- Grey s letter
to Sir A. Nicholson, dated 29th August 1907, in connection with the Anglu-
Russian negotiations, might certainly with advantange he reaffirmed in some
definite form. _
Turning to Afghanistan, on the assumption that the Amir maintains his
neutrality till the conclusion of the war, we consider that we shall be under
considerable obligations to him: and so will Russia. Afghanistan could at
any moment very seriously increase our embarrassments by joining our
enemies, and the fact that she has not done so whatever may have been the
motive, must count strongly in her favour. It is true that the present condi
tions in Afghanistan are unsatisfactory in the extreme; that we know that
Afghanistan is a hot bed of fanatical and anti-British intrigue ; that if the Amir
maintains his neutrality it will be due mainly to the fact that Afghanistan lies
between the devil and the deep sea—between Russia and ourselves. It is true
that Afghanistan has been, and is, a constant source of anxiety ; that it has
been a base of Pan-Islamist intrigue against the allied powers generally.
Rut in suite of all this, if Afghanistan continues to the end neutral, we shall
be under heavy practical obligations and there can be no question of our
agreeing to any alteration in the status of Afghanistan that would interfere
with its treasured independence. Indeed we shall have to consider some
signal recognition of the Amir’s services, both as a reward for the past and
an encouragement for the future.
Assuming that the political status of Afghanistan is to remain unaltered
we consider it of vital importance to the maintenance of that status without