Coll 17/35 ‘Iraq. Iraq – Saudi Relations. Demarcation of Frontier.’ [‎6r] (11/112)

that the result, if accepted, would deprive Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
or Koweit of territory which was rightfully theirs, they
could, and no doubt would, take steps to bring their point
of view to the notice of the State (or it might be both
States) which claimed the territory in question and if
necessary to enforce their counter-claim by whatever
measures appeared appropriate.
4. This is, however, a purely theoretical way of
looking at the question and it is clear that in practice
no point forming the meeting-point of the territory of
three different countries can be settled satisfactorily
without the co-operation of all three countries.
5. His Majesty’s Government are therefore anxious
that no final decision should be taken by Saudi-Arabia and
Iraq, with or v/ithout Egyptian aid, about either of the
termination-points of the Saudi-Iraqi frontier, unless they
have first had an opportunity of expressing their views.
At the same time, they are unwilling to place themselves
in the position of being obliged to accept the decision of
the Egyptian President, no matter what it may be. You
should therefore avoid saying anything which might be
taken to imply that His Majesty’s Government would regard
the President’s decision as binding upon themselves. In
that case, your reply might, if you see no objection, take
the line suggested in the following paragraph:-
6. The Iraqi Government’s note-verbale of the 8th
July has been referred to His Majesty’s Government, who
note that it is the intention of the Iraqi and Saudi-Arabian
Governments to settle the line of their common frontier,
including its eastern and western termination points, through
a Joint Commission under an Egyptian President. His
Majesty’s Government regard this as a very satisfactory
way of settling any difficulties which may have arisen
between the two governments over this frontier. Since
the work of the commission will cover the two termination
points, where questions affecting Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Koweit
territory will be involved, a decision by the President
which ran contrary to the view of His Majesty’s Government
might lead to the necessity of further negotiations between
the two parties and His Majesty’s Government. When,
therefore, the positions of the two termination-points come
to be discussed, His Majesty’s Government will gladly explain
to the two parties and to the Egyptian President their views
as to the proper positions of these two points. This can
probably best be done upon the ground and if they are given
adequate notice (which under war conditions must be taken to
mean several weeks at least) they will do their best to send
representatives to explain their views to the commission
when it reaches the neighbourhood of these two points.
7. Although His Majesty’s Government hope that they
will be able by some such procedure as that outlined above
to persuade all concerned to accept their view of the
proper positions of the two termination-points of the Saudi-
Iraqi frontier, it must be recognised that there is one
point in regard to which special caution is needed. In
spite of the general principle enunciated in paragraph 4
A