Coll 25/14 'Orders in Council: Koweit: New Order' [‎261v] (537/545)

P. 1004/24.
P. 127(5,24.
Tel. from Pol. Res. to C.O.,
17, Feb. 13 1028, P. 737.
Sheikh Ahmed evinced the least desire to have the dispute settled ; ’ neither
party raised the question at the Koweit conlerence in the same year; and
though in October 1921) the Sheikh oi Koweit was stated by the Political
Agent, Koweit, to be thinking ot paying I bn Sand a visit, the real object ol
which would be to induce him to remove the trade prohibitions, and tiiou^h
in February 1928 the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. reported that the effect of tjp
embargo was to create stagnation in Koweit trade, the commercial
prosperity of Koweit depending on Nejd, there has been no development
in the matter since that date.
+ P. 3336/24, P. 1668/25,
P. 2383/25.
§ P. 5729/27.
|| P. 534/28.
f P. 1311/28.
** Tel. from Pol. Res. to
€.0. Aug. 5 1928, 1*. 4423.
(c) The Akhwan Menace.
40. Akhwan raids on Koweit had taken place in 1924 and 19254 but on
an inconsiderable scale. The Akhwan raids on Iraq by keisal-al-Dawish and
the Mutair tribe at the end of 1927 had, however, more important reactions
on the Principality.§ At the request of the Sheikh His Majesty’s
Government agreed to aerial reconnaissance over his territory; and, with
his concurrence, it was later decided to withdraw the restrictions
originally imposed by His Majesty’s Government on bombing in pursuit
of raiders within Koweit territory. An Akhwan raid was successfully
dealt with by Koweit forces at El Hiqai on 27th January 1928, | and whilst
retiring into Nejd was pursued and successfully attacked by the Royal Air
Force on two following days. A further raid occurred late in February,
which was not opposed by ground forces, but was again successfully pursued
by the Royal Air Force for two days. In view of the possibility of further
serious developments, and of the recognised liability of His Majesty’s Govern
ment under existing engagements for the “protection of Koweit” (a phrase
the exact scope of which is open to argument^), further defence measures
were now taken. A temporary air base (political objections to a permanent
station being regarded as conclusive, cp. para. 47 below), was established
in Koweit: a flight of aeroplanes and a detachment of armoured cars were
despatched to the town for its protection : three vessels of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
squadron (later reduced to one) were stationed off Koweit itself, and a
landing party disembarked and remained on shore until the crisis had
passed. All action taken was taken with the concurrence of the Sheikh,
who was, in addition, allowed to purchase from the Government of India a
small supply of machine guns and Lewis guns. After some discussion
His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India agreed that
His Excellency might be allowed to purchase armoured motor cars, on
the understanding that they would be used only for defence, and would not
cross the borders of Koweit in repelling raids save with the concurrence of
the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. . The crisis, however, passed off without incident, and
the special forces which had been despatched to Koweit were withdrawn
during the late spring. For financial reasons the Sheikh abandoned the
idea of purchasing armoured cars.**
41. Consequent on the breakdown of the negotiations with I bn Sand in
the summer of 1928. and the possible danger of a revival of Akhwan activity
on the Traq-Nejd border, the question of granting discretion to the Air
Officer Commanding, Iraq, to carry out reconnaissances by air or car over
Koweit territory was raised by the Air Ministry.
42. The “ very obvious and grave political objection ” to air recon
naissance over Koweit was emphasised by Sir Gilbert Clayton. After
considerable discussion between the Departments concerned, the Air Officer
Commanding was finally authorised to carry out occasional reconnaissances
both by air and car, at his discretion, on the understanding that the
concurrence of the Sheikh should be obtained, through the Political
Resident; that reconnaissance should be carried out as infrequently and
in as unprovocative a manner as possible; that the Sheikh should be given
“no grounds for supposing that the Royal Air Force have assumed
responsibility for the defence of Koweit or that he himself has been
relieved of his obligations in this respect ”; that save in case of real
emergency reconnaissance should not be carried out within 25 miles of
the Nejd-Koweit frontier nor in the immediate vicinity of the Nejd-Iraq