Coll 28/67 ‘Persia: Annual Reports’ [‎4v] (8/14)

received an ovation. Qavam, on the other
hand, was given no credit for this spec
tacular operation, and it is doubtful how
much he deserved. His negotiations with
the Democrats during the previous months
turned out to be an effective prelude to the
climax, for when he saw how things were
going he displayed characteristic skill in
bringing the situation to a head, but there
is little doubt that the initial impulse and
the crucial decision were both taken by the
Shah. Qavam was swept along by the
current of events, and in Azerbaijan he
was not unnaturally regarded as the man
who would have sold the pass if he had
been left to his own devices. He did not
at any time visit the province and, in spite
of a determined effort, he was unable to
impose any of his candidates upon it in the
general election which followed. To a man
of Qavam’s ambitious temperament this
experience was particularly galling, and
there is no doubt that it served to widen
the existing rift between him and his
sovereign. If the Shah had had his way
he would have dismissed Qavam there and
then, but, had he done so, he could not have
escaped direct responsibility for dealing
with Qavam’s personal commitment to the
Russians to submit the proposal for an
oil agreement to the Majlis as soon as it
could be constituted. In the end, reluc
tantly but providentially, he agreed to
allow Qavam to extricate himself and his
country from their dilemma before giving
him his quietus.
6. The Imperial Firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’). ordering the
general election had been issued on
5th October, 1946, and Qavam had lost no
time in getting to work in the con
stituencies. By methods which are tradi
tional in this country and of which he is
a past master, he succeeded in securing the
return of his nominees everywhere except
in Azerbaijan and certain constituencies
where the Shah and the army insisted on
the election of candidates of their own
choosing. An interesting feature of the
election was that, before polling took place,
a group of Qavam’s political opponents
took ‘ ‘ bast 5 ’ in the precincts of the Royal
Palace at Tehran by way of protest against
the blatancy with which seats were being
sold to the highest bidders. For obvious
reasons polling was delayed in Azerbaijan
and also in Fars, where the general amnesty
of the Qashqai and their allies in the tribal
revolt of the previous autumn was followed
by some hard bargaining over Qavam’s
candidates, who were eventually returned.
By July some 110 Deputies had been
elected, of whom ninety undertook to sup
port Qavam, and the interminable process^
of scrutinising electoral mandates and #
electing officers began.
7. By the end of September it was nearly
complete, but, in the meantime, the Soviet
Ambassador had not been idle. Early in
August he reminded Qavam that action on
his undertaking was now overdue and con
fronted him with the text of an agreement
embodying the provisions enumerated in
the letters exchanged between them fifteen
months before. He warned him that he
and his country were at the parting of the
ways; they would have the Soviet Union’s
closest friendship and support if the agree
ment were ratified, but, if it were not, they
must prepare themselves to be treated as
C£ blood enemies.” Qavam replied that he
was bound only to submit proposal to
the Majlis and could not determine the
result. Notwithstanding the fact that the
Chamber was packed with his personal
supporters, it was already fairly clear that
it would not have allowed even him to force
the agreement through if he had wished to
do so. Truth and expediency, therefore,
went hand in hand, but Qavam’s main con
cern at this stage was to clear himself in
the eyes of his countrymen and to hold on
to office after the rejection of the agree
ment. His first move in the Majlis was to
submit to it a report on the circumstances
leading up to the exchange of letters, and
in it he sought to demonstrate that,
although under strong pressure, he had
acted in the best interests of the country.
He did not recommend either the accep
tance of the agreement or its rejection, but
suggested referring it to a committee. In
the event on 23rd October a single article
resolution was passed under double urgency
procedure with only one dissentient voice.
The provisions of this resolution were as
follows :—
(a) The Qavam-Sadishikov exchange of
letters in 1946 was considered null
and void and without effect,
although it was stated that the
Prime Minister had acted in good
faith in undertaking the discussions.
(b) A technical and scientific survey of
oil deposits should be undertaken by
the Government within a period of
five years, so that the Majlis might
make arrangements, in the form of
laws, for the commercial exploita
tion of these deposits.