Coll 28/67 ‘Persia: Annual Reports’ [‎5r] (9/14)

(c) No oil concessions should be granted
to foreigners nor any companies
established with foreign share
holding for the purpose of exploit
ing Persia’s oil resources.
(d) The Government might negotiate
with the Soviet Government for the
sale of any oil found in Northern
Persia under (b) above.
(e) The Government should undertake
negotiations and measures to
“ redeem the rights of the nation ”
regarding the country’s resources in
instances where these rights had
been impaired,” especially regard
ing the oil in the south.”
8. The final paragraph, as originally
drafted, contained specific references to
Bahrein and to the Anglo-Iranian conces
sion. These were subsequently dropped,
but they were soon to crop up again in
another form and in another place. The
passage of the resolution induced a wide
spread sense of relief not unmingled with
apprehension. The Russian reaction was
remarkably moderate, almost ominously so.
There were two stern notes of protest in
November and violent press and wireless
attacks on Qavam. The latter was already
confronted by a rising tide of opposition at
home, largely sponsored by the Shah, whose
resentment and jealousy could no longer be
restrained. Qavam’s Democrat Party was
split, his majority in the Majlis crumbled
away and eventually, at the beginning of
December his entire Cabinet resigned,
leaving him completely isolated. Shortly
before this happened Qavam delivered a
broadcast to the nation on 1st December
in which he sought to vindicate himself.
He severely criticised the Military Govern
ment of Azerbaijan, and it was felt that
some of his allusions were directed against
the Shah. It was this belief which led to
the resignation of his Cabinet. One
feature of the broadcast, which he repeated
in an address to members of his party two
days later, was a reference to the restitu
tion of Persian rights in Bahrein and in
the oil of the south. This repeated echo of
the concluding sentences of the resolution
rejecting the oil agreement was certainly
not fortuitous. In part it may have been
inspired by a desire to rally the forces of
the Left in this country and to curry favour
with the Russians, but there is no doubt
that it was also intended to embarrass the
British, on whose support Qavam had
counted to persuade the Shah to retain him
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in office. After an unsuccessful attempt
to secure a majority in the Majlis, he
resigned himself to the inevitable and in
the closing days of the year he left the
country for Europe.
9. Qavam left behind him a newly con
stituted Majlis of his own choosing which
was in no way united, even in its allegiance
to himself, and was largely composed of
time-servers who had been prepared to pay
his price. They were devoid of any con
structive purpose, filled with self-satisfac
tion at having thrown out the oil agree
ment and armed with powers designed to
make of their Chamber a brake on all
initiative. After the President of the
Majlis—^a supreme nonentity—had failed
in his attempt to form a Government, the
Shah prevailed upon a veteran politician,
Ibrahim Hakimi, to do so. The result was
not impressive and it was generally
believed that the new Government would
be a mere stop-gap. It was, however,
gradually built up and strengthened and
lasted until June. Hakimi’s first concern
was to abolish some of the more flagrant
abuses of the previous regime, in particular
military government and administrative
extravagance. He also lived up to his
promise to turn a deaf ear to the agitation
about Bahrein, which was just developing.
On the positive side, he earmarked for
capital works a gradually increasing pro
portion of Anglo-Persian royalties,
which were previously used to swell
current revenue. This decision was based
upon a report prepared for Qavam by
Dr. Mosharraf Naficy, who had been
entrusted with the task of working out a
Seven-Year Plan of economic and social
development. This report was published
in January and foreshadowed legislation to
establish and finance a semi-autonomous
organisation for the execution of the plan.
10. At the end of January 1948 a
strongly worded note of protest was
received from the Soviet Government com
plaining of the activities of the United
States Military Mission in Persia and
claiming that they constituted a potential
threat to the Soviet Union. The note con
tained an ominous reference to the 1921
Soviet Treaty with Persia, which provided,
in certain circumstances, for the occupa
tion of one country by the military forces
of the other. The Persian Government at
once replied categorically denying the truth
or relevance of this charge. Two months
later there was a further similar exchange
b 2