'File 14/15 Middle East Oil' [‎6v] (12/38)

represent one of the .ost important sources of G-cvernment revenue.
17 ,The main centre of production is in the seuoh, in who area north and -west of
the head of the Persian lulf. At -che present time five oilfields are in production in
this ^pjea; Masjid-i-Sulairnan and Haft Kel being tie oldest, and three new fields, Agha
Jari, G-ach Saran and Pazanum, viiich ire re, all brought into production during the v/ar.
All these oilfields are connected bv pipeline to the oil refinery and port at Abadan.
id. In 1942 all surplus wells in Persia were plugged as part of a denial scheme,
only sufficient wells being retained to enable the ILasjid-i-Sulaiman and Haft Kel fields
to operate, at maximum econo; c 'capacity, Willi the removal of the threat, wells and
fields have re-opened and or eduction extended. (Stop press: Production in 1945 was
17 , 000,000 tons).
19 . The refinery at Abadan is one of lie four biggest in the world, and the biggest
east of Suez. It played a vital part in the Allied war effort, supplying oil both to
ii.e lliddlo East and to India and the Par East. After the loss of the Par Eastern oil
supplies in 1942 it became apparent that the refinery, big as it was, would be insuffic
ient to meet all demands, and large-scale expansion was undertaken. By December 1944 an
additional annual refinery capacity of f, 000,000 tons had been added, bringing up the
total capacity to some 15,000,000 tons per annum. This has since been still further 'r*
increased and at present approaches 20,000,000 tons per annum. In the meantime new
processes haye been added and in particular thp production of high-octane aviation
petrol has been encrtously incteased.’ At the :u\break of hostilities there were no
facilities at Abadan for the manufacture of 100-octane'aviation petrol. Today Abadan
is equipped to produce upwards of 1,230,030 tons a year.
20. Virtually the whole of -die output of the Abadan refinery is exported. In
addition to supplying military and civilian requirements in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , the Indian
Ocean, in Eas and South Africa and in India, Abadan during the war has provided vast
quantifies for whe Middle East end South E: st Asia theatres of war and even further
afield. It is now available for U.K. and Briiish Empire requirements.
21. The A.I.O.C. concession also covers a much smaller oilfield in -..stern Persia
at Naft-i-$hah. Oil from this field goes by pipeline to a small refinery at Kerman shah
where it is refined, produces being sold for local consumption in Persia itself.
22. The ^.I.O.G* also has interests in Ira< through its share in the Iraq Petro
leum Go., in the Haifa : efinery, and in the newly developed centre of oil production at
Kuwait,
23. although the British-owned A.I.O.C. concession is the only oil concession at
present operative in Persia, .any other countries have attempted to gain a footing there
in the past and there is every likelihood of further attempts in the future. American,
Russian, Dutch, French and even Japanese combines have all attempted, at various times,
to obtain concessions.
24. A Dutch mining gre the Algemeene Exploratio Mij owns an exploratory licence
for m?.nerals covering part of northern Iran, gran bed in 1939 and giving them "oil search
and exploration rights” as well as the right to search for other minerals, but little
or no exploration has been carried out under this licence.
25 . Tie run a struggle for c'nee a.; ion 0 i tea remainder of the country h ' been ^
bet-ween Briv.is>', Russians aqd A eric ah 3 ar. ' .: a;:, back t the 19k0's. The enormolis
strategic and economic importance of petroleum was first realised during the Great w^T,
1914-18, and immediately after the War there ms a rush to acquire petroleum' concessions
in various parts of the mrld. In Nor shorn Persia, American, British and Russian,
interests were in competition. In 1921, the Standard Oil Company of America proposed
an oil concession in the Northern Provinces in exchange for a loan of ten million
dollars. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company then claimed that they already held a concession
which they had acquired in 1920. The following year (1923), a joint Anglo-American
undertaking was proposed, to exploit North Persian oil on a fifty-fifty basis. Upon
this, the Russians intervened. The Soviet Ambassador to Tehran officially informed the
Persian Government that Moscow would oppose any concession to foreigners for the ex
ploitation of oil in Northern Persia, Exclusive rights of exploitation, he claimed,
had belonged to a Russian subject. (The Russian subject in question, one Khochtinra, a
native of Georgia, lias acquired somewhat doubtful concessions dated 1 896 and 1916;
these -were che rights which the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. claimed to have purchased from
him in 1920). Although, by the Treaty of 26 Feb.1921 the Russians had renounced all
former concessions in Persia, One Persian Government, they claimed, had engaged itself
by the same Ti .acy not to grant those concessions to any other foreign country or
individual.
26. Since thac time, the Russians have consistently adhered to the claim that
they, and only they, have rights of oil exploitation in Northern Persia. Their policy
/found expression