'File 14/1- Vol 6 OIL CONCESSIONS MUSCAT' [‎184r] (367/438)

CONFIDENTIAL.
<L ■
Dubai,
^C/ 6 th June, 1948
/ \ * V>^ 9 ^ a *
Dear Jackson, ^ v ^
\ '
5.i»7
The position regarding my work down here as it was when I
returned about mid-May is explained in my letter of the 12 th May
to Stobart a copy of which I sent you.
2 . I have since then been unable to come to any agreement with
Ahmed al Saif of the Khawatir because the Sultan detained him un
til the 4th June in Muscat, The only information about the
result of the Sultan* s efforts that I have received is contained
in the telegram No.C/196 of the 5th June from the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. ,
Muscat from which I draw the following conclusions which may
or may not be correct. ^ rt
X. Unless the Sultan has bribed Ahmed Al Saif very heavily,
I do not believe he will be unwilling to meet me; he may be
unwilling to meet me in Baraimi itself and might wish me to go
to Hafit.
Again, subject to the same proviso as above, it is wishful
thinking to suggest that Ahmed al Saif will require the geologists
to work from Muscat territory; that is what the Sultan wishes and
seems to have reverted to in spite of the fact that I explained at
some length during my recent visit that we could not enter the
Hafit or Baraimi area from Muscat territory by car until he opened
up the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Jizzi. The Sultan is well aware that he would be
placing very serious restrictions on our operations if we were
forced to operate from Muscat territorybefore that were done.
If Ahmed al Saif has been bought over to the Sultan’s side, it
means that there is going to be trouble amongst the Naim and
Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan has already told me that he would at once
stir up every conceivable difficulty not stopping short of fight- |
ing if Al Saif went over to Saiyyid Said. That, then, is the
position as I see it and, to put it bluntly, the Sultan has either
succeeded in queering his own pitch or ours. The Sultan’s re
ference to Article (ii) of the Treaty is not understood by me
but his concern not to become involved in any responsibility for
the safety of foreigners is merely part of his well-known mania
on that subject asis very well demonstrated in Dhofar to this
day; I don’t think it has any real significance.
3. Mohammed bin Ali bin Awwad of Hafit was due to arrive in
Baraimi the day after I left and I deliberately avoided him so
as to give the Sultan a chance of seeing what he could do on his
own; I could easily have settled with him myself I am quite
certain.
4. Regarding the Bani Kaab.
I did not realise until I went to Muscat that the Sultan
had any serious pretensions to.those people and I said nothing when ]
he stated he would call Shaikh Obaid to Muscat and tell him to
settle with me. The latter came into Baraimi about ten days ago
and I asked him if he had had a letter from the Sultan. He ad
mitted he had and said he would not be leaving for Muscat for
some days. I told him the Sultan wished him to agree with the
Company to which he replied at once that, while he was prepared
to discuss thefts of camels etc. he was notprepared to talk about
oil with the Sultan since it did not concern the latter. It
would have been a physical impossibility for Obaid to have returned
from Muscat in time for me to settle with him before I left Baraimi
and unless I could bring in some other largish tribe before leav
ing I would have been unable to have told the company that there