Ext 5000/41(3) 'Persia - General Situation (Sept. & Oct. 1941)' [‎64r] (127/466)

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Sir K.Cornwallis.
No. 350.
11th October, 1911.
bo 12.30 a.m. 15th October, 1911.
R 0 1.20 a.m. 13th October, 1911.
RLPMTijD TO FORLIGN OFFICh No. 11 76.
Govermnent of India No. 138.
Fa.O.L^ LorCbqving
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«A I Z*M+01*Ia. Vj^aaI^iu.
emissary of Hama Rashid Khan (who is now in control
at Bana) has visited the Embassy. He declared that he had
been sent to ask the British Government to establish a
protectorate over Persian Kurdistan and to save the Kurds
from Persian tyranny.
2. He was told that the best course for the Persian
Kurds was to come to a settlement with the head of the Persian
Government._ ^If they did this it might be possible for us to
help by advising the Persians to be conciliatory.
. 3. The emissary obstinately maintained that, after
their past experience, it was quite impossible for the Kurds
ever to accept Persian rule again and enquired whether it was
the British Government's intention to re-impose Persian rule
over them by force. He was told in reply that so long as the
Persian Kurds helpud our forces when required to do so and
gave them no trouble it was unlikely that British forces would
take any military action against them. He must understand,
however, that any disorders which impeded our war effort would
be iirmly suppiesseu. The emissary left Bagdad on October
U-th for Bana.
# spite of the emissary's flat refusal to consider
a compromise with the Persian Government and in spite of the
lailure of the first efforts of the local Persian authorities
to come to terms with [gr. undec.j Kurds it seems probable that
before long (unless there is still further weakening of the
authority of.the Central Government) both sides will seek a
modus vivendi and I think from our point of view that it is
desirable that they should do so.
5* A .successful Persian re-conquest of Kurdistan seems
at present impossible and the continuation of the struggle
between, the Kurds and Persia v/ill make an uneasy situation in
the vicinity of our line of communications. Similar,
inevitably, disagreeable consequences would follow a situation
ol general tribal chaos which is a not improbable development
if the tribes are left to themselves.
6 ./
KECd.POL. DEPt.
i/’OCT 941
OFFICE