Coll 6/67(1) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎252r] (508/794)

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proceeded to make a suitable little speech of farewell. After hearing it, the
King said he had something further to speak about. His Majesty’s Government
were worried about restrictions on trade with Koweit. What of restrictions on
trade with Nejd ? I asked what he meant and found that he referred to the action
taken at Bahrein in regard to direct shipments to the Hasa Coast, and was under
the impression that “the Government” had prohibited such shipments. On my
asking whether he meant His Majesty’s Government or the Bahrein Government
he laughed scornfully at the mention of the latter. I said that I knew of only one
incident, in which the Bahrein Government had taken action to prevent an abuse
of the facilities afforded by Bahrein, by a ship which had tried to take advantage
of these facilities to land cargo at Bahrein and so lighten herself sufficiently to be
able to land cargo on the Hasa coast, where the ports were not equipped to
receive cargoes in the ordinary way. I observed that the ship had proceeded
before the matter could be referred to higher authority, but that His Majesty’s
Government had subsequently proposed a discussion of the whole subject of
transit, including that of direct shipments to the mainland. The Saudi Govern
ment had rejected this proposal, and, on receipt of a further communication from
the Legation, had transferred the negotiations to London, with the result that I
had not been concerned in them for nearly two years.
23. The King was insistent that no obstacles should be placed in the way of
direct shipment to his ports. If it was a question of port equipment, he said, he
could complete the equipment in two months, but what would be the good, if ships
were prevented from taking cargo to Ras Tanura? And why should that port
be treated differently from Debai, Basra or any other port ? He asked for an
assurance that, if he did equip Ras Tanura, ships should not be prevented from
going there. Indeed, at one moment he asked that they should be told to go there,
to which I replied that His Majesty’s Government could not in normal times
direct the movements of ships. I pressed him on the subject of the alleged
prohibition and at last elicited the admission that he could not substantiate the
allegation, though he still evidently thought that an adverse attitude was being
taken up. I promised to report what he said, but adhered to my own view that
the Saudi Government would have done better to fall in with the proposal of His
Majesty’s Government for a general discussion with the object of reconciling the
interest of Bahrein and the mainland by an agreement, which could, if necessary,
be made operative for a fixed time. • ^ i j p
24. The chief interest of this discussion was the revelation it attorded o±
the King’s bitter personal resentment. He threw out references which I did not
understand, to other countries like Japan, &c., and their attitude towaids similai
problems. He clung to his grievance long after the latest hour at which he told
me he could say his prayers. It was well after 9 when I was able to leave him.
25 Shortly before 10, Sheikh Yussuf called again to deliver the Arab
clothes, which I had consented to receive. At 4 a.m. next day he was on the spot
once more to see me off. I delayed my departure a short time for a final word
about the Bahrein question. I said I had been impressed by the King’s anxiety
to treat the question of direct shipments as a separate issue. I did not wish His
Majesty to think that I had been difficult the previous evening, and assured him
that on my return to London I would go into the whole matter.
26 The foregoing account of my conversation at I ait is accurate on ail
main points, but is not an exact record of all that passed, e.g., as regards the
seauence of the individual discussions. For one thing my interpreter was far
from well, and the King tried him very high, by delivering long speeches^
impossible to render in all their details after he had let himself go. I have
omitted various non-essentials e.^., the King when ^^^IhakespeT ^
^ Northern Arabia, referred to conversations with Captain bhakespear m
which he had similarly foreshadowed the Great War, and, m professing his
friendship for His Majesty’s Governm 7V h t de a od lb o e thers%hTt fl HTs C Mriesty“
as being unaffected by the suggestion of Turks and others that His Maj y
Government^wMe^in reality, ^hostde^to^him.^^ the King is genuinely
desirous of consolidating Ms position ins-MMs o H^ Maiest^s Government but
is extremelv bitter over certain recent. aspects of their policy, notably tne
attempt To impose on him the “blue line.” He is almost equally bitter over the
Bahrein question, because all that he has grasped of it is the appearance in Ms
eyes of aO attempt to boycott his endeavours to develop Ras Tanura and to keep