Coll 6/67(1) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎280v] (565/794)

• s ;i
46
to them on the occasion of the latter treaty; though it is no doubt open to H.M.
Government to argue, on the other side, that while as the result of their breach
with Turkey they were prepared to ignore the Blue Line, and, as proposed on tb
initiative of H.M. Government, to agree to a subsequent territorial delimitation,
the Blue Line, which was internationally legally binding, must be the starting
point of any discussions designed to bring about a modification.
(C) Status of the Trucial Sheikhs, and their relation to the Wahabis: 1800
to 1934.
227. H.M. Government, without consultation with or any protest by the
Wahabi Amir, in 1806 entered into an agreement with the Jowasimi Sheikh of
Basal Khaimah-Shargah for the suppression of piracy (paragraph 24 above). In
1820 (paragraph 34) they entered into a general maritime treaty with the
predecessors of the present Trucial Sheikhs. They have maintained those treaty
relations since that date and have supplemented them by engagements, either with
individual rulers, or with the Trucial Sheikhs generally, regarding slavery and
piracy in 1838 (Ajman, Debai, Abu Dhabi, Shargah); 1839 (Ras al Khaimah);
1843 (all Trucial Sheikhs); 1847 (all Trucial Sheikhs); 1853 (all Trucial Sheikhs),
1864 (Shargah, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Debai, Umm al Qaiwain); 1868 (Abu Dhabi
and Qatar); 1873 (Shargah, Abu Dhabi). In 1887 they secured <c exclusive
agreements” from the Trucial Sheikhs, which were confirmed and strengthened
in 1892, since when control of the foreign relations of these sheikhdoms has rested
with H.M. Government. Further undertakings were obtained from the Trucial
area in 1902; 1911-12 (pearling and sponge-fishing concessions); 1912 (Shargah-
Tamb light-house); 1922 (oil). The treaty of 1820 and all subsequent treaties were
entered into with the Trucial Sheikhs as independent States, and H.M. Govern
ment, in so far as they have found it necessary to apply forcible pressure to the
Sheikhs to ensure their compliance with the engagements accepted under those
treaties, have done so without reference to, protest by (save in 1883^—paragraph 46
above), or the prior sanction of, any other power.
228. Since 1823 H.M. Government have (paragraph 36) been locally repre
sented by a native Agent Non-British agents affiliated with the British Government. , with headquarters at Shargah, of the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency.
in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Since 1932 the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. has informally been placed
under the supervision of the British Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Bahrein. The history of
the period since 1800, as recorded above, illustrates the close contact consistently
maintained with the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. by the Resident, which inevitably arose from
the obligations by the Sheikhs and by H.M. Government under the Maritime
Truce of 1820 (paragraph 34), and the subsequent engagements by which it was
supplemented.
229. The historical survey above goes to suggest that between 1800 and 1870
the Trucial Sheikhs (but Abu Dhabi to a much less extent than the Jowasimis of
Shargah), were for considerable periods under a large, though not consistently an
effective, degree of Wahabi influence, if not control. But the important division
in the area seems to have been that between the religious factions of the Hinawis
(represented by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat) and the
Ghafaris (represented by the Jowasimi Sheikh); the minor Sheikhs of Ajman and
Umm al Qaiwain, who normally co-operated with Shargah-Ras-al Khaimah, and
of Dibai, who normally co-operated with Abu Dhabi, changing sides according as
one or other of the two major Sheikhs seemed likely to assume a dominating
influence. Wahabi influence declined in this area after 1853 and disappeared
altogether, save as a purely religious movement, after 1870. It appears to have
revived only in the period subsequent to 1920. The long breaks in the continuity
of Wahabi influence in Trucial Oman A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. apart, it can fairly be maintained that the
Trucial Sheikhs have throughout, in continental as well as in maritime affairs,
been independent political entities, even if some of them were negligible in size,
and if most, if not all, were by land responsive to or entirely under the influence
at various times of the strongest neighbouring power, whether that power was
Muscat or the Wahabi Amirs. It seems difficult in any event for Ibn Saud to base
any substantial claim to suzerainty over these sheikhdoms or their immediate
hinterland at this stage, merely on the broken record of Wahabi influence in
Trucial Oman A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. during the period between 1800 and 1870, or on its revival in the
period subsequent to 1920, at a date when he had by formal treaty engagements
undertaken to respect the independence of these States.