Coll 6/67(1) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎314r] (632/794)

-p oiV 8 ™ 1111 run through the reasons I gave in my memorandum
ot the 23rd February, 1932, for the then apparent deterioration of Ibn Sand’s
political position : —
(c) The administration of the Hejaz has not become less efficient, and has
per aps somewhat improved. There are fewer internal signs of discontent with
e Saudi regime than there were in 1931. It cannot be called popular, but some
eas o e ubes aie too broken to think of resistance, the townsmen seem
more resigned, and some of them have an increasing interest in the stability of
the present regime. J
r ^ indications as afford a criterion suggest that Ibn Saud
has strengthened his position vis-a-vis the extreme Wahhabi opponents of modern
ideas It is impossible to form any exact estimate, but the King has shown
^ oidness ™ variou 1 s directions, and less is heard of the Ulama of Neid. In
of hand^ 8 a D 6 t0 ma ^ e USe tde ^^hwan, without letting them get out
xr i Ibn baud s isolation in the Arab world is less pronounced than it was.
lie has learnt to control his hatred, if not his suspicion, of the Hashimites. Care-
±uHy run trued sympathy with him seems to abound in Palestine and in Syria,
peihaps also m more independent Arab countries. The unexpected death of
King I eisal last year has removed his most conspicuous rival in the Arab world.
His display of moderation in nis final settlement with the Imam has advertised
him as a man who is first and foremost a good Arab, all the more so as other good
Arabs, line the would-be mediators, headed by the Grand IVIufti of Palestine, have
been enaoled to claim an unearned share of the credit. He has, in fact, discreetly
avoided any appearance of a desire to dominate the Arab world too exclusively
and has beaten with ah the more effect the Moslem Arab drum.
(d) Remaining himself a good but not extreme Wahhabi, Ibn Saud has
tended to show greater tolerance towards Moslems of other denominations, both
Sunni and Shia, He divides the sympathies of non-Arab Moslems generally, but
he has probably more admirers in countries like India, and perhaps the Dutch
East Indies, than he had some years ago. Even in Egypt, the third largest
contributor to the pilgrimage, there is a strong tendency to criticise King Fuad’s
policy of holding him at arm’s length.
(e) Ibn Saud is still isolated from the general life of the family of non-
Moslem nations. Even here, however, there are signs of a readiness on his part to
increase his intercourse with individual nations; and. though the signs are small,
they may foreshadow a process capable of considerable acceleration in the more
favourable conditions which would result from a consolidation of his position in
Arabia. He has realised that he must look west for any serious help in developing
his resources, witness the grant of the Hasa Oil Concession to the Americans and
his readiness to treat with Europeans for the grant of other concessions.
(/) He is still poor in competent advisers on other than purely Arab affairs.
There have been no notable additions to the list, but the men he has have grown
somewhat in stature. His Minister of Finance has learnt the useful lesson that,
while old debts may be put on the long finger, current liabilities must be met, if
credit is to be maintained. Payments in respect of immediate transactions have
been much more punctual of late. Fuad Bey Hamza is a doubtful factor. He has
advanced in the art of diplomacy, but he does not seem to enjoy the full confidence
of Ibn Saud, and his own heart-searchings in quest of a larger life may sweep
him out of the King’s service. Should he remain in it and retain his health, he
is capable of rendering much service as a liaison between Saudi Arabia and the
modern w'orld. Even Sheikh Yussuf Yasin has achieved more elasticity. Some
other less well-known men have also come on, like Muhammad Tawil, a Hejazi,
whom Ibn Saud has used successfully in Hasa, and perhaps the Ibn Muammar, a
Nejdi, who represents him in Bagdad.
9. Ibn Saud has shown no further signs of physical decline. He has grown
somewhat lethargic in his habits; but he looks fit, lives a healthy life, especially in
Nejd, no longer overeats (if, indeed, there was truth in the Sheikh of Koweit’s
suggestion that he used to), and imposes his will on his advisers in all major
matters. Even the story current some time ago of his impotence seems to have
been exaggerated, as he has had a son within the last few months.
10. It would be going far beyond the mark to suggest that the future of
the Saudi regime is assured, but Saudi Arabia offers at least as much prospect of
[156 gg—2] b 3