Coll 6/67(1) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎315r] (634/794)

ff S ronlH^P^ were ^f s neighbours. The argument would be stronger, if
Ibn Saud b Ln tha i N ®^7 Koweit frontier was redrawn in 1922,
f P f tly adn i ltted the validity of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of
regarding tte Wejd-^Koweit'boimdMy. ^ “ Jedda ° f the M « 0tiati °-
16. Whatever the legal position, the political considerations are of much
haTanWriXT /' ^ con 7 1 ( . nCe ^ th - at Ibn Sflud wiU never admit that the Turks
ruled a y nd €h;!h 086 u f terrlto " es over which . he affirms, his Arab ancestors
nartb hv TV^B hvi’ 1 ?i h J S r® 6 ?, usur P ed > P artl y by the Turks and
nnsitin^hnwe 8 Ha a 1 t d ^ TUrks 18 m hlS blood ' and he wiU a^P 1 no
r h 0 ^ 6 ™ 1, susta ! ne d by legal argument, which rests on an ex post facto
Popf Adrian Vbulf rightS ' 006 aS W611 6XpeCt Mr ' de Valera sw a llow
, r 1 ~- :' N " 01 Ibn Saud waive his claim to jurisdiction over tribes like the
Murra, who may or may not have submitted to his ancestors, but who have been
withm fe sphere of influence and no other for many years. However great his
desne for a rapprochement with His Majesty’s Government he will be at least as
insistent on his claim to a great part of the hinterland of the Trucial coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. as he
has been on his claim to Najran, which, until the Imam admitted it, rested on
similai foundations. He may accept a compromise, but not a compromise turning
on a minor modification of the “blue line,” or a compromise involving the
recognition of a British sphere in the interior of Arabia, distinct from "their
sphere as quasi-protectors of the coastal States. If he recognised the existence
of such a distinct British sphere, he would go down to Arab history as one of the
lost leaders.
• 18 A y 0 n0t t3link 1 exa gg erate when I say that the future relations of His
Majesty s Government with Ibn Saud will depend very largely on their attitude
in regard to this question. If we take the possible course of shelving it on the
basis that each side reserves its position, he will remain with a rankling sense of
injury. In my opinion the issue must be faced, and His Majesty’s Government
must choose between a more or less open breach with Ibn Saud or a generous
settlement with him.
19. I have throughout regretted the unwillingness of His Majesty’s Govern
ment to admit frankly to Ibn Saud that their interest in the area in dispute is due
largely to its oil potentialities. He himself undoubtedly realises this, but has
been too canny to raise the question of his own initiative. His interest is to assert
territorial claims over an area which has been left indeterminate. That of His
Majesty’s Government, as I see it, is to show cause why it has become important
to define the position in that area, and the best way to do so would be to discuss
frankly the economic reasons for doing so.
20. In Part (C) of my memorandum of the 23rd February, 1932, I reviewed
three possible policies in regard to the questions then outstanding between His
Majesty’s Government and Ibn Saud. They were in a nutshell: (a) positive
support; (b) friendly laissez-faire; and [c] stiffness all along the line. On the
whole, I favoured laissez-faire, and, on the whole, that policy has been followed,
except as regards the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier question. I am now inclined to
favour a more constructive policy, the corner-stone of which would be a generous
settlement of the “blue line” question. The expiration of the original period
of the Treaty of Jedda and Ibn Baud’s recent expression of a desire for
“conversations” provide an opportunity for seeking a fairly comprehensive
understanding with him, if it should suit His Majesty’s Government to enter
into one.
21. The form and scope of such an understanding would require careful
consideration. As regards the form, we might contemplate a treaty and annexes
to be substituted for the Treaty of Jedda, a supplementary treaty or a series of
exchanges of notes. As regards the scope I suggest tentatively the following
points for consideration :—
(i) His Majesty’s Government very naturally ruled out any sort of an
alliance, and would presumably find it equally impossible to
guarantee the security of Ibn Saud. They have, however, fore
shadowed, subject to a satisfactory settlement of certain questions, a
formula giving expression to the special nature of their relations
with him. It might achieve his object to some extent, if the suggested