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Torgpred, which was attended by certain officials on both sides and leading
Persian merchants. He had summarised the grievances of the Persian merchants,
and then proposed that if the Soviet Government were genuinely short of funds
in Persia and were really under the impression that Persian buyers were not in
a position to effect payments, the Persian Government would purchase all Russian
imports, and deposit in a bank all sums as they became due, the funds thus formed
being available for Soviet purchases in Persia. Teymourtache went on to s^\
that the Soviet commercial representative had accepted this proposal, subject,
perhaps, to reference to higher authority, but to the Minister of Court’s wrath
and indignation, he had denied the fact in an official communique published in
Tass soon afterwards.
441. This attitude of the Minister of Court, it should be noted, is in striking
contrast with the opinion he expressed to Sir Robert Clive in May 1930, as related
in paragraphs 265 and 266 of the annual report for that year. Subsequent
developments also proved the fundamental fallacy of the views then held by
Teymourtache as regards Soviet Russia’s “ need ” of certain Persian exports.
442. Furthermore, the Persian Government came to realise in 1932 that
Russian purchases of Persian products were by no means an unmixed blessing.
All was well when the Russians bought for their own needs, e.g., cotton and rice,
but when they bought fruits, gum, carpets, &c., for the purpose of realising
foreign exchange on world markets, their sales were as often as not below their
landed costs, thereby ruining the trade for all other exporters of Persian produce.
This has been particularly true for carpets, so much so that the Persian Govern
ment themselves profess to be determined to exclude the Russians from this trade
altogether. This, however, is only part of a comprehensive scheme which aims
at centralising Russo-Persian trade in the hands of a syndicate of Persian
merchants (see paragraphs 458-459 below), who would in effect enjoy a monopoly
of trade with Russia, among other advantages, and who would consequently only
sell to the Russians what was considered good for them. If the Russians refused
to deal with the syndicate direct, then they would be invited to deal with the
Persian Government, who would appoint the syndicate their buying and selling
agents. The Russians in some way or other must be persuaded to guarantee the
purchase of minimum yearly quantities of those Persian exports for which no
other market than the Russian could at present be found, especially rice and
cotton.
443. This policy called for radical amendments to the commercial treaty
with the Soviet Government, and in order to bring matters to a head and have
some excuse for claiming that the hands of the Persian Government had been
forced by Persian vested interests, the Minister of Court set to work during the
summer of 1932 to play on the feelings of the Persian merchants, insisting that
it must pay them ultimately to show a united front against the Russians and put
an end to the economic duresse in which they sought to hold Persia. By a
mixture of threats and promises, he succeeded in persuading the merchants of
Gilan to enforce an actual boycott of the Russian trading and transport
organisations. This set in on the 22nd December, Persian truculence going to
the length of picketing the Russian offices and bringing their business to a
standstill. The Russian counterblast took the form of three ultimata, which were
delivered on the 1st January to the Governor of Gilan, the Director of the Depart
ment of Commerce and the Shah’s factotum respectively, to the effect that, if the
boycott were not called off before the 5th January—
(a)
organisations
in Gilan would be closed and the
The Russian trade
personnel sent back to Russia.
(b) All Russian purchases of Persian products would cease forthwith.
(c) The Shah’s sale of his 1932 rice crop to the Russians would be cancelled.
(It may be noted in this connexion that no other part of this year’s
crop had been bought up to the end of the year, to the intense distress
of the two great producing Provinces of Gilan and Mazanderan.)
444. Once again the Persian cat had scratched the Russian bear. The bear
had reacted swiftly, and it remained to be seen whether the cat might stage a
not too undignified and perhaps even a strategic retreat, attended by one or two
minor tactical successes.