Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎65v] (130/644)

180. It was common ground that special measures of control were required
in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and that the principle of the special zones ought, if possible,
to be maintained. The main question for decision was whether it was essential
to keep the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (and the Gulf of Oman) in the special zones, or whether
control of the traffic in arms could be assured by other means, such as a bilateral
arms traffic agreement with Persia.
181. If His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom were to succeed
in securing the inclusion of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. in the special zones (which was
problematical in view of the half-hearted interest of the other Powers), the
Persian Government would, it was known, refuse to be a party to the agreement
in which this provision was embodied. Their abstention would have the
disadvantage that His Majesty’s ships would be unable to “ investigate ” vessels
flying the Persian flag. On the other hand, it would have the compensating
advantage that Persian warships would not acquire the right of “ investigating ”
any vessels, including Indian and Arab vessels, which did not fly the Persian
flag. This advantage was, however, qualified by the fact that Persia might always
change her mind and adhere to the agreement at some future date, thereby
acquiring rights which might prove very damaging to the prestige of His
Majesty’s Government. It was, moreover, considered that, generally speaking,
the Persian Government would not in any case acquire the. right of searching
Arab vessels, the Arab rulers not being parties to the agreement, so that the
question of Persian abstention lost some of its importance.
182. The alternative to the inclusion of Persia in the maritime zones was a
special bilateral agreement with Persia, to cover the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , together with
a general agreement to cover all other maritime areas. The Persian Government
were known to be ready to conclude an agreement by which the control of Persian
vessels would be reserved to Persian warships, and the control, or at least the
“ investigation,’ of all other vessels to British warships. It would clearly be
necessary for the Powers who were parties to the general agreement to acquiesce
in the control of vessels flying their flag, when in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , by His
Majesty’s Government. But there was reason to think that the other Powers
generally would welcome any arrangement which His Majesty’s Government and
the Persian Government might reach between themselves to cover the Persian
Gulf, and that their acquiescence might be forthcoming.
183. The mam objection to a bilateral agreement was that His Majesty’s
Government would thereby lose their right of searching Persian vessels for arms.
But as this right was based upon a permission (commonly, but inaccurately, called
the firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’). of 1897 ) accorded by the Persian Government thirty-six years
before to meet circumstances which no longer existed, and as there was nothing
m the terms of the note m which this permission was accorded to prevent the
Persian Government from revoking it at a moment’s notice, it was doubtful
whether its loss would be a very substantial disadvantage. Moreover, the mere
inclusion of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. m the special zones would not confer any rights
on anyone so far as Persian shipping was concerned. The shadowy nature of the
light was admitted in some quarters, which nonetheless maintained that there
was a general though possibly mistaken, impression in the Gulf that the British
navy possessed certain powers of control with regard to the traffic in arms, and
that any action likely to destroy this impression, such as a public surrender of
e principle of the special zones or a public disclaimer of the right to search
avoided VeSSe S ’ mi » ht lead to a recrudescence of the arms traffic and ought to be
184 In other quarters again, it was held that while this might be true in
a general way, the possibility of a serious recrudescence of the armf traffic in the
Gulf was very remote. There was, finally, the political aspect which was that
e Persian Government illogical as it might seem if the implications of inclusion
were carefully studied, objected to the inclusion of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. in he specM
zones on grounds of national pride, and that if His Majesty’s Government were
^ m f et \ them t0 the extent of concluding a bilateral agreement, to which thev
attached a curious importance, they would not only vastly improve their
Disarmament 1 Conference! aV ° ,d ^ ° f the ° ther Powers at