Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎148v] (296/644)

265. The situation thus seemed to have reached a complete deadlock, but at
Nuri Said’s farewell audience the Shah, to the discomfiture of M. Feroughi and
M. Kazemi, agreed to recognise the whole frontier in return for an anchorage oi
one or two kilometres at Abadan. He went on to urge Nuri Said to remain and
conclude certain heads of agreements, but the latter explained that he must leave
in order to go to Geneva. It was arranged, however, that negotiations should
be continued there forthwith on the above basis.
266. Nuri Said had still, however, to obtain clear instructions from the
Iraqi Cabinet in regard to the Conservancy Board Convention, and the latter s
eventual decision involved a fairly considerable departure from the existing
scheme. Briefly it was that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
should be invited to participate in a tripartite convention, which should give the
Iranians an equal voice in executive matters affecting navigation, but should
accord them only supervisory powers in regard to dredging and other conservancy
operations.
267. It was with these instructions that Nuri Said arrived at Geneva; but
for various reasons the Irano-Iraqi question remained for some time in abeyance
there, and when negotiations were resumed the Conservancy Convention was
rather relegated to the background. Instead discussions seem to have centred
primarily on the draft of a proposed Treaty of Friendship, one article of which
was intended to redefine and finally establish the whole frontier line. No settle
ment was reached, however, as the Iraqis had not yet decided on the limits of
width to which they would attempt to restrict the Abadan anchorage, while
M. Kazemi continued to press for its extension to the thalweg. It was eventually
agreed that further negotiations should take place in November in Bagdad
(a) for a Conservancy Board Convention, and (b) regarding the limits of the
Abadan anchorage. Meanwhile, Nuri Said and M. Kazemi contented themselves
with initialling a Turco-Irano-Iraqi Non-Aggression Pact and a bilateral treaty
for the pacific settlement of disputes, drawn up in accordance with the model
prepared by the League of Nations in 1928.
268. The following weeks were occupied by His Majesty’s Legation in
endeavouring to secure the definite acceptance by the Iranian Government of the
principle of a tripartite Conservancy Board Convention. M. Soheily seemed
svmpathetic towards the idea, but said that he could not commit himself until
the return of M. Kazemi towards the end of October; the latter was, however,
evasive and attempted to put all the blame for the delay on Nuri Said, though he
subsequently informed the Iraqi Minister that he was prepared to agree to
British participation in the board. Shortly afterwards it emerged that the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs had lost the 1932 tripartite draft and had not even
got any later one in their possession. Noury Esfandiary, the Iranian expert who
was to go to Bagdad for the negotiations, was accordingly working on the basis
of the bilateral draft communicated to Nuri Said in August. Mr. Mallet there
fore explained to him the arguments in favour of a tripartite convention, and
added that a further objection to the existing draft seemed to be its omission
of any reference to the Karun and Bahmanshir. Noury Esfandiary replied that
he was still without instructions regarding British participation in the
negotiations.
269. Later Mr. Mallet was authorised to communicate to him the latest 1935
draft, explaining the technical arguments in favour of the inclusion of the
Bahmanshir, and adding that the draft had been put forward as a basis for
discussion. On this second occasion Noury Esfandiary confirmed what
M. Soheily had recently told the Iraqi Minister, namely, that the Council of
Ministers had agreed to British participation in the negotiations, but that they
still awaited the Shah’s approval, and had meanwhile telegraphed to M. Kazemi
in India for his views.
270. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Minister had an audience with the Shah, and
on instructions from his Government requested His Majesty to confirm that he
had only asked for an anchorage one or two kilometres long at Abadan. The
Shah seemed affronted at this request, and after some hedging took the line that
he had asked for a frontage unspecified in length but roughly covering the
whole port.