Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎162v] (324/644)

VII.— Military Affairs.
(A) The A rmy.
(1) General.
497. The past year might seem to the Iranian General Staff one of brilliant
achievement, and, to the casual onlooker, one, at least, of steady advancement.
Conscripts are coming in, being trained and returned to their homes with
regularity, and this cannot be without its effect either as propaganda or on the
military spirit of the population. Schools of military education are widely
distributed and functioning satisfactorily. An unprecedented amount of war
material has poured into the arsenals.
498. The provincial garrisons, except in Baluchistan and Kurdistan, have
remained on a peace footing and at liberty to devote their attention to training.
In these two provinces the troops have at least held their own against the
tribesmen and have inflicted as many casualties as they have suffered, and their
refraining from the offensive is due probably to political reasons rather than to
feelings of inferiority or to ineptitude. The real weakness of the Iranian army
actually lies in what their General Staff would consider to be their chief strength,
i.e., armament. They have neglected the elementary truth that nothing can take
the place of training; they have allowed themselves to be dazzled by mere
possessions; they have erected an imposing facade of guns for which there are
no shells, of aeroplanes they cannot maintain, of vehicles they cannot drive, and
of mechanical devices they cannot comprehend. A detailed appreciation—even
were it possible to write one—of the value of the Iranian army as an instrument
of war is outside the scope of this report, and their present situation may be
sufficiently indicated by saying that their passion for purchase has exhausted
their means of maintenance or by comparing them to an inexperienced and
incompetent chauffeur placed in sole charge of a fleet of expensive motor cars of
intricate design.
(2) Expenditure.
499. The budget allotment for the Ministry of War for the Iranian year
1314 (the 22nd March, 1935, to the 21st March, 1936) is 223,729,980 rials
(£2,796,624( 1 )), an increase of 20 million rials (£250,000( 1 )) over last year’s
figures. This sum includes provision for the Navy and the Air Force for which
no separate heads are shown. To this may be added 25,678,400 rials (£320,980( 1 ))
for the road guards, 400,000 rials (£5,000( 1 )) for conscription expenses, 6 million
rials (£75,000( 1 )) for the frontier guards. Thus the total military or semi
military expenditure amounts to 255,808,380 rials (£3,197,604( 1 )), or, approxi
mately, 34 per cent, of the national revenue. In addition, on the 13th March, a
supplementary budget law was passed by the Majlis, granting to the Ministry of
War credit for £2 million, with the proviso that the expenditure of this sum
should not be limited to the current financial year.
(3) Strength.
500. The strength of the Iranian army as estimated on the 1st June, 1935,
was 87,049 of all ranks. This figure represents an increase of nearly 13,000 over
the estimated strength for 1934.
(4) Organisation.
501. The chief changes effected in organisation in 1935 are as follows :—
(i) The increase in status of the Khuzistan Brigade to a division with
headquarters at Ahwaz and the inclusion in that formation of the
Luristan Brigade (headquarters at Khurramabad).
* Note. —A conversion rate of 80-00 rials per £ sterling has been employed.