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but no confirmation of that supposition was ever obtained. Iran has a non-
aggression treaty with Soviet Russia and this was quoted by M. Molotov at about
the time when the commercial treaty was concluded, but this gave little comfort
to the Iranian Government, not onty because of their standing distrust of Russia,
but also because they remembered that a similar treaty had not saved Finland
from attack. I here was great apprehension as to what passed at the
Hitler-Molotov meeting in Berlin in November, and although the anxiety became
less acute, the Iranian Government seemed to have come to the conclusion by
the end of the year that they could not expect any help from Germany against
Russia at present and that it was even possible that Iran had been recognised by
Germany as in Russia’s sphere of interest.
14. Russian influence inside Iran certainly increased during the year. The \
provision in the treaty of March for direct dealings between Soviet trade repre
sentatives and individual Iranian firms and merchants had perhaps not begun
to have any great effect, but the public could not be uninfluenced by the Soviet
films which began to be shown regularly in one cinema in Tehran—some of them
pure Soviet propaganda. Moreover, the hopeless condition of the country caused
large sections of the population to turn their eyes to the north, either in hope,
or in the despair arising from the feeling that any change must be for the better.
1 here was even a movement among the intellectuals in favour of Soviet Russia.
15. The prestige of Germany in Iran naturally increased greatly as a
result of the series of victories which culminated in the fall of France, but it
diminished somewhat towards the end of the year when Great Britain not only
continued to hold out but was able to dbfeat the Italians in Libya. The German
cause was assisted by a well-organised propaganda comprising all the necessary
elements*—pamphlets and periodicals, a whispering campaign, films and news
reels, and above all the wireless broadcasts in Persian from Berlin. These broad
casts eventually went too far : already in May the local press complained that
they were directing complaints and threats against “neutral countries.” and
when a little later they contained violent attacks on the Shah, complaints were
made to the German Legation. The German Government alleged that the
offensive material had been introduced by the Persian announcer without
authority, and although the lie was not believed, the removal of the announcer
and the cessation of attacks on the Shah and on Iran, were accepted as sufficient
reparation. 1 he authorities, however, stopped the giving of foreign broadcasts
in public and the Germans lost thereby a valuable form of propaganda. The
intense activity of the German community in Tehran and elsewhere 5 at the time
when the fate of Holland and Belgium showed what havoc a Fifth Column
could work in a neutral country gave good ground to suppose that the Germans
in Iian were piepaiing some coup or at least taking dispositions which would
fac ilitate <i coup in case of need. This possibility was repeatedlv brought to the
notice of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and efforts were made to convey similar
warnings to the Shah by a roundabout route. There is little doubt that one of the
leasons, probable the mam reason, for the removal of the Prime Ministei
Mr. Matin Daftari. towards the end of June, was his notoriously pro-
German attitude. The authorities did not take all the measures that seemed
desnable, but it was clear that they were alarmed, and they probably went as far
as the) dared. They did not remove essential machinery from German ships at
Bandar Shapur, to make it impossible for one of them to slip out and sink itself
m the fairway and block the Shatt-al-Arab, but they did establish a stringent
supervision over the crew; they did not reduce the German community to the
size proportionate to the work it professed to be doing, but they did send away
some Germans whose actions seemed suspicious, and a very close watch is kent
upon those who remain. Unfortunately the Germans are interested in so many
enterprises which are considered by the Iranian Government as essential from
the erection of German blast furnaces to the carriage of Iranian exports to
Germany and German imports into Iran, that “cover ” for illegal activities is
easily provided It was discovered in November that one of thes? activities was
to foster anti-British intrigues m Iraq.
16. [he Germans soon recovered their pre-war position as Iran’s best
customer and principal supplier of goods. When Italy entered the war the
Trieste route, through which His Majesty’s Government had allowed Iran to
receive a large quantity of German arms and material, was closed, but noods