Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎261v] (522/644)

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troops and for their very presence on Persian soil; but also for the incompetence,
mismanagement and continued corruption of the Persian administration. The
widespread shortage of wheat, sugar and other essential commodities was easily
attributed to the selfish British, and no credit was for a moment given for the
supplies which were despatched to Persia in considerable quantities and in ships
badly needed for other purposes. For the growth of this feeling a skilful
pro-German propaganda, and in particular the daily broadcasts in Persian from^*
Berlin, was partly to blame, but it has become almost automatic in Persia to
attribute to Great Britain the responsibility for any unpleasant event that may
occur. Even the Persian Government, who were in possession of all the facts,
though pressed continually by His Majesty’s Minister to give them publicity in
the press and on the wireless, supinely preferred to occupy themselves with other
matters, regardless of the fact that their own prestige was receiving a corres
ponding set-back. The abdication of Reza Shah gave a momentary fillip to our
reputation, but the inconveniences and privations resulting from the war in
general and from the occupation in particular, soon reduced us to the position of
permanent villain in Persian eyes.
21. It was in these unfavourable circumstances that negotiations for a
treaty of alliance between Persia, Great Britain and Soviet Russia were
launched on their long and tortuous course. The proposal had originated with
His Majesty’s Government even before the overthrow of Reza Shah, and had the
personal approval of the Prime Minister, Mr. Firoughi, and Sir R. Bullard was
instructed on the 14th September to inform Mr. Firoughi and his Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Soheily, of the desire of the Allied Powers to conclude such a
treaty, negotiations for which might be initiated as soon as the question of the
Axis Legations and communities was satisfactorily solved. Mr. Firoughi
promised to work to that end immediately on the conclusion of the constitutional
crisis which had arisen out of the abdication of the Shah. On the 1st October
a copy of the draft text, which had been drawn up in London, was communicated
unofficially to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the same time, in order to
create a more favourable atmosphere, the question of withdrawing British and
Soviet troops from Tehran was under consideration. On the 6th October,
however, Mr. Soheily addressed identical and somewhat peremptory notes to
Sir R. Bullard and M. Smirnov, requesting the evacuation of Tehran and its
neighbourhood in order to ally public anxiety, restore security and permit the
Persian Government to carry on with the administration of the country. These
notes were obviously directed against the Soviet Government and had an
unfortunate effect on M. Smirnov, which did not predispose him to treaty negotia
tions, though he had hitherto appeared to share the opinion of His Majesty’s
Minister, that the proximity of the Allied troops to the capital tended to
demomlise the Persian Government and to create the risk that the Allies might
be dragged into the administration first of Tehran and then of the whole country.
The Soviet Government, however, accepted the British draft treaty, which was
communicated to the Persian Government officially on the 17th October. On the
same day British and Russian troops withdrew from the neighbourhood of
Tehran. , ^ .
22. The examination of the draft by the Persian Government was now
adversely affected by the Russian withdrawal in the Ukraine, which, to the minds
of the majority of the Persians, seemed likely to result in th$ early occupation
of the Caucasus by the German forces. When the German community was ejected
from Persia, they departed with loud assurances that they would return in three
months. This fear of the return of infuriated Germans bent on revenge for their
summary dismissal was artfully fomented from abroad by the Berlin broadcasts
in Persian, and from within by agents, of whom the great majority were them
selves Persians, certain of the invincibility of German arms, seduced by German
gold, and looking for reward, or at least hoping for immunity if the country
should be occupied by the Germans. Moreover, it seemed certain that to reconcile
the Persian public to an alliance with the traditional enemy—'Russia—would
prove an almost superhuman task in view of the reports (usually exaggerated) of
the behaviour of the Russian troops. The Prime Minister himself was old. tired
and preoccupied with grave problems of internal security, food shortage and a
financial deficit. Universally respected though he was, he had neither the
physical strength nor the forceful personality necessary to reconcile the divisions
in a pusillanimous Cabinet. The negotiations initiated in this uneasy atmos-