Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎269r] (537/644)

26. There was some correspondence with the Persian Government about
communications with Bahrain, which is only mentioned as it showed that the
Persian Government maintained their territorial claim to the island.
27. An incident occurred at Khorramshahr, on the 20th December, when
the quarters of a number of Indian employees of the A.I.O.C. were looted by a
Persian crowd.
m^/typture of Relations with Japan and the April Crisis.
28. In spite of the signature of the treaty, the situation of the Allies in
Persia continued to be most unsatisfactory in the early part of the year. Our
requests on many important questions remained unmet and enemy propaganda
continued to flourish up and down the country. Many of the difficulties which
we experienced were traceable to the activities of the Japanese Legation, who
were actively distributing enemy propaganda and also money among the
Persians. Ihe rupture of relations between Persia and Japan accordingly
became one of our primary objectives on wLich progress in every other sphere
seemed to depend. The Anglo—Soviet-Persian 1 reaty could not be quoted in
support of our representations to the Persian Government owing to the fact
that' Japan was still in diplomatic relations with Russia. It w 7 as, however,
urged upon the Persian Government that the closing of the Japanese Legation
could reasonably be expected as an earnest of goodwill amongst Allies; that it
would not harm Persian interests in Japan, or Japanese interests in Persia
both of which, to all practical intents and purposes, were non-existent; that the
continued presence of the Japanese Legation here could serve no useful purpose
as all bag and cypher communication facilities had been denied them and that
the Japanese Legation was, in fact, nothing more than a centre from which
military intelligence reports were sent to the enemy (they w 7 ere known to have a
secret wireless transmitter).
29. In spite of long and repeated representations, begun early in February,
no progress could be achieved with this question for about two months. It was
necessary to use every possible form of inducement and pressure. I he United
States Government were persuaded to make the grant of lease-lend facilities for
the Persian Government and the provision of expert advisers dependent on the
rupture of relations with Japan. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the
Persian Government that they had no objection to their breaking off relations
with Japan. His Majesty’s Legation communicated to the Persian authorities
evidence collected from secret and other sources to prove that the Japanese
Legation were indulging in undiplomatic and subversive activities; finally, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister and the Shah himself were
warned in categorical terms that the situation would seriously deteriorate unless
early satisfaction were given. .
30. Every conceivable prevarication was indulged in by the Persian Govern-
jnent to keep the Japanese Legation, which they presumably regarded as their
last policy of reinsurance with the Axis Powers. Che patience of His Majesty s
Government in the United Kingdom was eventually exhausted. In the middle of
April the Soviet Government was informed that we had decided to concentrate
troops outside Tehran and to occupy the capital if necessary and enfoice the
closing of the Japanese Legation. n i 1
31. It was arranged that Sir Reader Bullard would then demand an
immediate audience with the Shah and insist on the rupture of relations with
Japan. The Soviet Ambassador was told that, if British forces were eventually
obliged to occupy Tehran, and if the situation should so develop as to render
other measures necessary, the Soviet Government might wish to be associated in
the occupation of the capital. Flis Majesty’s Government would welcome such a
decision. The Persian Government, however, sensing, no doubt, that His
Majesty’s Government had made up their minds to take forceful action, finally
o-ave up the unequal struggle, and on the 12th April instructed the Japanese
Minister to leave Persia with his staff in one week. Eventually the Legation left
Tehran on the 23rd April. . t ,
32. Meanwhile, there existed other acute causes for dissatisfaction with the
Persian Government (a) It was proving increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient
rial currency in exchange for sterling to finance the expenditure of the British
military authorities on road, rail and aerodrome developments in Persia. The
statutory limit of the note issue had been reached, and the Persian Government
were unwilling or unable to persuade the Majlis to increase it. Yet clearly the
work of developing communications with Russia had to proceed; {h) no effective
measures had been taken by the Persian Government to stop Axis propaganda