Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎273v] (546/644)

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66. A reorganisation to suit its limited role of maintaining interna
security was initiated in February. The full scheme allowed for eight divisions
(seven of three brigades and one of two brigades) amd an independent brigade at
Isfahan. Each brigade was to consist of one regiment of infantry, one squad
ron of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery. The total paper strength ot tiis
reorganised army was 86,000, but its actual strength has been considerably ess
than this figure. The organisation is not yet complete, partly owing to norma
Persian inefficiency and partly to the reluctance of the Russians to allow 1 ersi^i**
troops in the areas occupied by Soviet troops. _ .
67. A new scheme has now been prepared by General Ridley of the united
States army, who arrived in Tehran in October, nominally as adviser to the
Intendent-General’s Department of the Persian War Office, but he is m fact the
adviser to the Ministry of War without official position. He proposes ten
divisions totalling 53,000 fighting men. Recruits, staffs, services and training
establishments bring this total to 86.000. His proposals do not greath anect the
organisation of combatant units except that he recommends the temporary dis
bandment of nearly all of the field artillery. He is more concerned with
improving the system of recruit training, the organisation of communication,
transport, supply and medical units which do not now exist, and the increase of
pay and allowances to officers to an extent that will make honesty at least possible.
An increase of nearly 100 per cent, in the army budget will be required to pay for
this unprecedented condition. . r , ,
68. Motor transport is essential to the successful operation ot General
Ridley’s scheme. The almost complete lack of transport has served as a ready
excuse for the inactivity of the Persian -forces during the past year. Two
hundred lorries are understood to have been despatched from America at the
request of General Ridley. He is optimistic that, given suitable equipment, the
Persian army can, with American guidance, be transformed into a force capable
of being of value to the Allies, at least in the preservation of order and protection
of the lines of communication. This must depend on there being an adequate
number of American officers and on their being given some degree of authority.
For this there is both opposition and support within the army. The Shah wavers
between the hope that American advisers might produce large quantities of
equipment and his fear that American officers with authority might tend to
strengthen the control of the Cabinet over the army and limit his own direct
control. It is believed that this question has not yet been fully discussed
between General Ridley and the Persian Government.
Gendarmerie.
69. Since its separation from the Ministry for War in September 1941 and
its return to the Ministry of the Interior, the gendarmerie has suffered all the
misfortunes of orphanage. Its administration has been neglected and in its
operations it has not often had that support from the army which was the essence
of its effectiveness in the time of Reza Shah. It is grossly underpaid, its detach
ments are badly housed and almost unfed except for what they can beg or steal.
Consequently, its numbers and its morale are low. The miserable conditions
offered attract few T volunteer recruits and its numbers are maintained only by
drafting to it unwilling conscripts from the army. Owing to its almost complete
lack of n transport and means of communication its effectiveness in protecting
communications is very limited. The arrival of three American officers as
advisers has done very little to improve the state of affairs. They have blinded
themselves to the urgent needs of the immediate present by fixing their eyes on a
beautiful but quite impractical, ideal organisation, which would only be
justified if the army were to be abolished. Given the support of the army the task
required from the gendarmerie is not heavy. What is immediately required is an
improvement in the conditions of service and some means of mobility and
communication.
Persian Air Force.
70. The strength of the Imperial Persian air force at the end of 1942 was
2,012 officers, n.c.o.s and enlisted men The flying personnel consisted of 54 officer
pilots, 88 sergeant pilots, 67 officer observers. There were 201 aircraft held on
charge, of which 123 were serviceable and 78 unserviceable. Of the
serviceable aircraft, forty-two machines were of trainer type and the remainder
either obsolete or obsolescent. The lack of modern aircraft, the shortage of fuel,
oil and spare parts, and the limited number of aerodromes and landing grounds
left to the Persian air force rule it out of consideration as a fighting force. After