Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎280v] (560/644)

6 '
proved particularly difficult. The cereul shortage at the beginning of the jeai
was due largely to the failure of the northern zone to make that contribution in
grain which, as the most fertile part of Persia, it might have been expec e o
do, and had in fact always done hitherto. It is difficult to decide to what extent
this was due to a definite Russian prohibition and to what extent to Russian
acquiescence—unlike the active co-operation with the Persian authorities wnic
we showed in the south—in the slackness of the landowners and the officials^
Both factors were present, and the Russians niade a virtue out or tnen an
social attitude, for they fostered the absurd opinion that if there was more too
in the north than in the south, this was because the Russians were more generous
than the British to the Persian population. Owing to shortage of wheat, the
bread issued in Tehran at the controlled price remained poor in qualitv foi ihe
first two or three months of the year, but the quality was just beginning o
improve with the arrival of the first consignments of the 25,000 tons of wheat
promised to Persia by the British and American Governments m the previous
year, when the Soviet Government, without consulting the British or Americans
(who. of course, had kept them fully informed of the progress of their negotiations
of the previous year and had even suggested that Russia should sign the wheat
agreement even if only as a gesture) suddenly announced that they would supply
25,000 tons of wheat for Persia. The Supply Department^ suggested that the
Soviet Government should not take from Azerbaijan the 5,000 tons of wheat
they had induced the Persian Government to sell them and should reduce bv
that amount the wheat to be supplied from Russia, but this would ha\e reduced
the publicitv value of the Soviet offer and the sanctimonious reply was gi\en
that this was impossible as the whole of the 25,000 tons from Russia was meant
for the poor of Tehran. In spite of this the British and American representatives
made further attempts after the 1943 harvest to secure Russian co-operation m
the matter of grain supplies for Tehran and other large towns. 1 he Soviet
Ambassador declared that the Soviet authorities would not need any wheat (they
continued, however, to collect the arrears of the 5,000 tons for which they had
contracted, as well as the rest of the 15,000 tons of barley). Later they even
admitted that the north ought to contribute 40.000 tons for the feeding of the
rest of Persia, and promised to assist in the carriage of this grain, both by rail
and, where necessary, by the back-loading of motor lorries working under
Iransovtrans. By the end of the year one-fifth of this programme had been
fulfilled and the prospects for its complete execution were poor.
21. The Soviet policy of aloofness applied in the same way to transport
and civil supplies. Wishing no doubt to escape responsibility, as well as to
remain free from its regulations, the Soviet authorities did not keep their
promise to participate in the activities of the Allied Road transport Board.
Similarly they took no part in the Allied effort to organise civil supplies, but
simply sold goods (often direct to merchants) in an attempt to obtain rials and
to develop their trade regardless of Middle East Supply Centre and Persian
control. In some cases Soviet action entailed a serious burden for the Persian
economy, as, for instance, the Soviet-Persian Financial Agreement, which was in
much less generous terms than our own, and the Munition Factories Agreement
for the supply of rifles, &c., to the Soviet Government under such conditions that
only loss could accrue to Persia. At the end of the year no price had even been
fixed by the Russians for the payment of munitions supplied.
22 Russian influence with the Shah has increased to a noticeable degree
since the appointment of General Razmara in October as Chief of the Shah s
Military Cabinet. This officer is known to be well disposed towards Russia
and hostile to the American advisers, and he will no doubt be used by the
Russians to counteract Anglo-American influence. Further, at the time of the
Tehran Conference, the Shah was deeply flattered by the visit paid to him by
Marshal Stalin at the Palace, particularly in view of the sympathy which His
Majesty felt that he had found in the Marshal for his personal ambitions and
the security of his position as Shah. The Russian offer of aircraft and tanks
made on that occasion flattered the weakness which the Shah shares with his
father and predecessor for an army which looks impressive rather than for one
adapted to the needs of the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that very
soon afterwards the Shah removed from office the Ministers of War and Interior,
the only two strong men in the Cabinet, in view of their supposed anti-Russian
views. Stalin’s advice in favour of strong personal rule and a large army was
strange, coming as it did from a person whose embassy was openly backing the
Tudeh party, whose members had hitherto been violently opposed to both.