Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎285v] (570/644)

7 4C
Tribal Situation.'
68. The weakness of the Government, its lack of any consistent policy and
the ineffectiveness of its forces have been responsible for its failure to re-establish
control in large areas of tribal country. An uneasy peace has been secured by a
policy of giving way to tribal leaders and by avoiding undue interference in
tribal affairs. But this policy, by strengthening the influence of the tribal leaders^,
must inevitably increase the difficulties of the eventual establishment o
Government authority, which must be preceded by disarmament. For the time
being the stronger tribes have little to complain of from the oppression of
Government officials; they have benefited by the high prices prevailing for grain,
mutton and wool; they escape conscription to a large extent; and if they do not
always pillage the peaceful villager they usually levy tribute in some form or
another. On the other hand they can justly complain of almost total neglect
by the Government in the matter or provision of medical and educational facilities
and of tea, sugar and cloth.
69. In Ears the situation is particularly unsatisfactory. After the
demoralising defeat inflicted on the Persian army at Semirum (see section on
Persian Land Forces), the Persian Government realised that they could rely
neither on their commanders nor on their troops to compel the submission of
Nasir and the Qashgai tribes. Frightened at the prospect, they called on
Qavam-ul-Mulk to raise the Khamseh tribes, who had formerly been under his
and his family’s leadership, in support of the Government. But, hardly had they
made this decision, when they wavered in the face of the criticisms of Nasir s
supporters in Tehran and of the champions of peace at any price, and, taking the
immediately easier way, they approved a policy of conciliation of Nasir and his
brother Khosrow and the tacit recognition of. their leadership of the Qashgai
tribes. They made certain conditions, which have, of course, not been fulfilled.
Nasir was to surrender the arms which had been taken at various times from
Government forces and to hand over certain Germans wlho were known to be in
Qashgai territory. At the end of the year the situation was that Nasir and
Khosrow had greatly increased their influence in Fars; the Government being
unable to give any protection to property situated in areas dominated by the
Qashgai tribes, landowners were forced to accept Nasir’s terms; Nasir has been
steadily acquiring wealth by the sale of grain on the black market and by levying
tribute on villages and landowners; German agents are still at large, if not always
in Qashgai territory yet still under Qashgai protection; and the Persian army
appears to be no nearer the day when it can deal with Nasir by force. But there
is no serious disturbance, and provided that Nasir is allowed to continue to have
his own way it will be to his interest to show that he can restrain the lawlessness
of his tribes within moderate bounds.
70. He seeks to extend his influence to Kuh-i-Galu, and especially to the
Boir Ahmadi, of whom certain sections played the principal part in the attack
on the Persian troops at Semirum. But the rebel Boir Ahmadi leader, Abdullah
Zarghampur, has little reason to trust the Qashgai and is well occupied with
dissensions in his own tribe and rivals in Kuh-i-Galu. These dissensions led to
some unrest on the borders of the oil-fields from Masjid-i-Suleiman to Gach
Saran, but, except for an occasional hold-up of road traffic and a raid on the
pumping station at Do Gumbadan, where the raiders contented themselves with
looting the houses of some employees, there has been no direct interference with
the oil company’s interests. Any deliberate attack by a responsible chief is
unlikely, but while Germans are present with the tribes the possibilities of
sabotage must be guarded against.
71. In Bakhtiari also the old ruling family has got back to power. Again
because of the weakness of their forces and the inefficiency and corruption of their
officials, the Persian Government were obliged to depart from their avowed policy
of preventing the return to positions of authority in their own country of
important tribal chiefs and to call on Morteza Quli, son of the late Samsam-es-
Sultaneh, to accept the governorship of Bakhtiari. He is the most respectable
and influential of the Bakhtiari Khans and the least likely to indulge in adven
tures harmful to the Government. In the short view his appointment has been an
undoubted success. Bakhtiari is more settled and peaceful than for many
months past. The rebel Khan Abul Qasim, seeing that Morteza Quli’s influence
was ousting his own, decided to submit, and he is now living in Tehran. There
are inevitably the usual family feuds and jealousies inseparable from any
Bakhtiari rule, but it is to be hoped that Morteza Quli’s sense and influence will
prevent their leading to disturbance. Bakhtiari is relatively peaceful, but it is
to a large extent an autonomous tribal entity.