Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎291v] (582/644)

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review, but particularly towards the end of it, Anglo-Persian relations weie
grossly distorted in the mirror of the local press. ' „ .
9. In one important respect this fundamental dishonesty of the I ersians
in their attitude towards their two principal allies brought upon them an eai )
retribution. Although His Majesty’s Government had obviously suneied much
annoyance from the wrong-headed nationalism of Reza Shah, many
continued to foster the belief—at once pleasing to the Russians and soothing c
Persian national vanity—that the tyrant had been maintained m power by t ie
Rritish, w r ho had only discarded their puppet at long last under the stiess ot
circumstances beyond their control. The manifest incapacity of the Persians to
govern themselves in the post-Reza period was ascribed, under this convenient
theory, to the after-effects of the ex-Shah’s tyranny, and hence to the British.
In particular, the press never tired of denouncing the alleged greed ot tine
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which is in fact the main source of the country.s
wealth) and of asserting that Reza Shah's attack on the company s former con
cession had been a put-up job. When, therefore, the Russians demanded of the
Persian Government the immediate grant of an oil concession without prior
discussion of its terms, and pretended that in doing so they were only asking
for parity with the British, it was impossible for the Persians to retort, as they
might otherwise have done, that the British concession had been properl}
negotiated and freely accorded. This lesson to liars wms, however, small consola
tion to the British victims of the lie, since the resultant weakening of the Persian
case was by no means in British interests.
10. Since the Russians became our Allies in 1941, loyalty has damped down
criticism of Soviet Russia to such an extent that the toregoing paragraphs,
which consist largely of a catalogue of Russian misdemeanours, might give an
impression of prejudice. The attempt to avoid giving such an impression has,
however, been sadly hampered by the facts. The purpose of an annual review* of
this sort is to record salient events and observed tendencies; and in Persia the
actions of the Russians have always been of paramount importance. It would
have been almost a relief to have been able to record one or two resounding
: British misdemeanours in order to give a semblance of balance and objectivity,
but here again the facts have been most intractable. British policy, propaganda
and action in Persia during the year under review—and, indeed, throughout the
whole course of the war—have been monotonously unimpeachable and strictly
loyal to our Soviet ally. ...
^ 11. It is indeed'probable that the Soviet authorities, to whom suspicion is
second nature, entertain the deepest suspicions of British policy in this country,
but unless we are to hark back for ever to u intervention after the last war we
. can only regard their suspicions as we regard some of their actions, as
easier to explain than to justify. When a Soviet Ambassador, in
discussing a financial claim for a few hundred pounds which a Panamanian
would settle out of shame, uses the meanness and effrontery of a fraudulent
bankrupt, our realisation of the fact that he may be feeling the breath
of the N.K.V.D. hot on his neck leads us to understand his attitude but
hardly to consider it either honourable or fair. This embassy has deprecated
certain small British indiscretions committed since the occupation, not because
we thought that reasonable men would be justified in thinking them hostile, but
because we know that men who live in constant danger of being liquidated pn
suspicion cannot themselves be good judges of straightforward conduct. In only
one instance—the aerodrome construction mentioned in the section entitled
“ Soviet Interests ” could it be reasonably held that our action gave good ground
for suspicion. Did the Russians demand an oil concession in the north because they
observed wdth suspicion our attempts to obtain one in the south ? It may be so;
but the suspicion is thereby merely explained not justified. To an important
extent-Russia owes her salvation during this war to oil supplies from the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, whether sent to Russia or employed in Persia in the
transport of other forms of aid; and the whole record of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company contradicts the allegation that His Majesty's Government exploit
British-held oil concessions for unfair political ends. Moreover, if suspicion had
been the sole motive for the Russian action, the Soviet Government should have
been satisfied once that action had ruled out the grant of a concession to the
British, even to the Americans during the w T ar. Do the Russians suspect us of
intriguing with the southern tribes against the Central Government ? The Soviet-
inspired Persian press has much to say on this subject; yet, whereas we in the
south permit and even facilitate the Central Government’s disarmament opera
tions in tribal territory, they in Azerbaijan do nothing of the kind. Do the
Russians resent the extent and success of our war-time propaganda in Persia?