Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎308v] (616/644)

4
publicly as an “ Imperialist ” Power. We could not be certain the Russians
would choose the alternative we desired but there was a reasonable chance that
they might.
18. At the Potsdam meeting in July, it was agreed tihat British and Soviet
forces should withdraw from Tehran at once, and that the Council of Foreign
Ministers, at their meeting in September, should consider further stages ot
withdrawal. Under instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty’s Embassy
made persistent attempts to persuade the Soviet Embassy to co-ordinate the
withdrawal from Tehran, but received no reply. The evacuation of British
troops and stores began methodically soon after the Potsdam decision, but the
last stages were delayed by technical hitches. The last troops left by the
2nd October, only a small liquidation party remaining. Without any warning
the Russians withdrew their troops from Qaleh, Murgheh airfields on the
18th September, and claimed to have left Tehran, although they continued, in
fact, to hold in it about 250 troops, 45 houses, and the railway station.
19. Meanwhile, on the 20th August, His Majesty’s Government began to
use the weapon of publicity. Mr. Bevin, the new Labour Foreign Secretary,
announced in Parliament that His Majesty’s Government did not desire, and
did not believe that their Soviet Allies desired, to take advantage of the treaty
facilities in Persia for any purpose other than the prosecution of the war.
Mr. Eden, commenting for the Opposition, added that His Majesty's Govern
ment had only one interest in Persia, to see her prosperous, united and strong;
the last thing they wanted was a recurrence of the zones of influence of many
years ago.
20. On the 9th September the Persian Government sent notes to the
British, Soviet and American Embassies requesting that Persian territory should
be totally evacuated by the 2nd March, this being six months after the signature
of the Japanese armistice, adding that evacuation before then would arouse the
gratitude of the Persian nation.
21. At the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London at the end of
September, Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov exchanged correspondence about the with
drawal of British and Soviet troops. Mr. Bevin mentioned the obligation to
withdraw by the 2nd March, and proposed that, by the middle of December 1945
the British forces should be withdrawn to the southern oil area and the Soviet
forces to Azerbaijan. M. Molotov replied that the withdrawal of troops should
be effected within the period laid down in the treaty and that if necessary the
plan for the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops could be discussed
towards the end of the said period. He added that the Soviet Government
attached exceptional importance to the strict fulfilment of obligations under
taken. (M. Molotov thus evaded any commitment as to the actual date of
withdrawal.) ' -tit
22. On the 5th October the Tass Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. reported that a considerable
number of British forces still remained in Tehran. His Majesty’s Embassy
countered this by issuing a communique giving exact details of the small rear
party remaining in Tehran. Although the Soviet Government had refused to
discuss any further immediate withdrawals, the British forces withdrew from
Hamadan, Khorramabad and Kermanshah areas by the 21st November, and the
embassy gave publicity to this fact also. The squadron which had been main
taining security north of Zahidan was withdrawn to India by the 28th November.
23. On the 22nd November the Persian Government addressed a note to the
Soviet Embassy asking why there were still Soviet troops in Tehran. Stung, no
doubt by this and by the publicity given to British withdrawals, the Soviet
authorities abruptly withdrew their remaining personnel, including the railway
mission, out of Tehran at the end of November n .
24 On the 5th December the Foreign Office instructed His Majesty s
Embassy in Moscow to suggest to M. Molotov that plans should be discussed,
in accordance with his letter to Mr. Bevin in September, for the final with
drawal of Soviet and British troops. M. Molotov replied that the question need
not be discussed before February, assuming it should appear necessary then
25. On the 24th November the American Ambassador m Moscow had
proposed to M Molotov in connexion with the Azerbaijan crisis, that all Allied
troops should be withdrawn from Persia by the 1st January. The American
note referred to the Declaration regarding Persian territorial integrity,
signed bv President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, at Tehran in
19 4 3 ;n| j state d the American view that the Persian Government should have
full’ libertv to move their forces through Persia if they saw fit. The Soviet
Government replied by reiterating their intention to adhere to their treaty