'File 8/20: MUSCAT STATE AFFAIRS: RISE OF OMANIS' [‎6r] (11/634)

The situation then is this : "We hnve, in Oman opposed to each other a
nominal ruler whose existence depends almost entirely upon our good-will, and
a vii’ile but uncivilised and fanatical Government which we cannot support.
Our problem is to make these warring elements coalesce.
It had been determined to leave the solution of the difficulty till the end
of the war but that looked for period appears still far off and, in the meantime,
the situation is going from bad to worse.
The Imam has been in possession now for four years and, as time pro
gresses, his position gets stronger and defections from the Sultan’s cause con
tinue till the latter does not know upon whom he can depend. His financial
position gets worse and worse, his debts increase and he has not the money
with which to purchase the support which he requires.
The subteriuges to which he has to descend to obtain money for his
ordinary household expenses are humiliating and the little respect in which he
is held is weakened by the sight of the Sultan’s cheques being hawked about
the bazaar in the hope of some one producing some money for him.
We cannot leave Maskat to find its own salvation in its own wav owing
to its position athwart the main route to Baghdad, Basrah and the Persian
Gulf. Our policy has been hound up with the place for more than a century
and it cannot be allowed to tall into the hands of any one who might be even
unfriendly. We are accordingly tied here by our interests, and there is no
course open to us but to continue to support the Sultan in the present
juncture.
It only remains to consider what should be the nature and form of that
support, in giving which we assume a great moral responsibility.
It will be our duty to remove all legitimate cause for complaint which
may exist and to see that the country has a government which is just,
equitable and firm.
I lie Sultan is already aware that, without our assistance, his permanent
rule is impossible. It remains for us to impress upon Hie tribes that, without
our approval, their very existance is a matter of difficulty, but it is evident
that, whatever decision may be arrived at as to our future action, whether that
action be of a peaceful or forcible nature, we shall of necessity ultimately be
responsible that peace conditions are maintained.
Such being the case and whatever the amount of interference we may be
compelled to make, our freedom of action will be fettered by the French
Agreement of 1862 and it would appear that now is the moment ‘to get that
Agreement rescinded.
French interest in Maskat in recent years is due to the French and
Russian combination of some 30 years ago, which was made with the
object of diminishing British influence in the Fersian Gulf.
To-day France has one subject in Maska* and but little interest in
Oman beyond the 12 dhows which still fly the French flag.
With our position at Basrah and Baghdad and the events of the war the *
French must have changed their ideas in this reference. It is true that, in
September 1913, we confirmed to the French Government our intention to
conform to the treaty but that was before the war since when circumstances
have altered: Tve could now well point out that, for the security of our posi
tion at Basrah, we must have control of the situation at Maskat.
I have already suggested that local requirements demand immediate
action.
The two ruling factors in this are firstly, the indebtedness of the Sultan
and his family and the inaptitude and the administration.
Ihe financial condition of the Sultan has already been mentioned and his
brothers, uncles and the female members of his family are in no better state
Many of their debts become a burden on the Customs upon which their
various allowances are already a tax, while I have a long list of claims against
them, and even against His Highness pending in my court, claims which are
put oil from day to day aud remain unsettled. Indeed they cannot be
settled.