File 4931/1916 'Arabia [Nejd]: Bin Saud's subsidy. Payment of subsidy authorised on 1 Jan. 1917. Question of incidence. Payments made without Treasury authority' [‎83v] (175/418)

the boundaries of Arab independence claimed by him (Proposal 2 ). In the same area
lie asked for our assent to the abolition of the Capitulations, and our assistance in
securing an “ International Convention ” to the same effect (Proposal 5).^
The proposal regarding the Capitulations was ignored by His Majesty s Government^
and does not appear to have been referred to again by the Sherif.
With regard to British priority, which Sir H. McMahon proposed to extend to the
political as well as the economic sphere (p. 50), the Foreign Office instructed him as
follows in their telegram of the 20 th October, 191.5 : —
“ Unless it is necessary in order to secure Arab consent, you should not
include the stipulation that they will recognise British interests as paramount and
work under British guidance. &c. Such stipulation might give rise m France to
the impression that we are aiming not only at the _ securing of Arab interests, but
also at the establishment of our own interests in Syria at the expense of the
French (p. 52).
On the 24th October, 1915, in his second letter to the Sherif, Sir H. McMahon
interpreted these instructions as follows :—
“ When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice
and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of
government in those territories.
£C On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the
advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and
officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration
will be British” (p. 54).
The point was taken up again in Sir E. Grey’s telegram No. 860, of the
2 nd November, 1915, to Sir H. McMahon :
“ I propose that my main object shall be to persuade the French Government
to agree to include within the Arab boundaries the cities of Aleppo, Homs, Hama
and Damascus.
“ In order to gain this point, however, we must be ready to waive the
condition that European officials and advisers of the Arab Government are to be
only British, and that the Arabs are to turn to Great Britain alone for guidance
and yd vice.
“ I should like to know whether this condition was included not to meet the
wishes of the Arabs, but merely for the sake of our own interests. If the hitter is
the case and if by dropping it we can obtain the concurrence of the French
Government in promising the four cities to the Arabs, I shall consider myself free
to do so in consultation with Mr. Chamberlain (Secretary of Shite for India).
“ To win the Arabs over to our side against the Turks is our vital and
foremost object, not the acquisition of a new sphere of influence for ourselves ”
(p. 60).
This was answered by Sir H. McMahon on the 7 th November, 1915 :—
“ It was at the express request of the Arabs that the clause concerning the
advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that all advisers and officials
should be British, was included. They do not welcome the idea of French
influence in the territories of the four cities, and were anxious to have British
advisers, &c., there—in fact, they wished the clause to apply to the whole of
Arabia” (p. 61).
This view was in a general way corroborated by a passage in a letter, dated
the 28th December, 1916, from Sherif Husein to Sir Ali Morghani:— 1<J
<£ It is impossible for us to acknowledge any other Power than Great Britain
in our communications and representations. I say this from a purely economic
point of view, but from the military point of view we none of us ignore the
certainty that we shall stand in great need of the power of Great Britain to
extinguish any trouble that is liable to break out in the interior of the country in
the initial stages of so great changes ; more particularly because our friends 20 will
not hesitate by all possible means to incite their own partisans against us for their
own ends, in spite of the fact that they will have to defend their own interests in
19 30674/16. 20 ? The other independent Arab rulers.