File 4931/1916 'Arabia [Nejd]: Bin Saud's subsidy. Payment of subsidy authorised on 1 Jan. 1917. Question of incidence. Payments made without Treasury authority' [‎184r] (376/418)

Minute Paper.
Department.
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3413—1
3Q00
From Sir P. Cox, \4th January 1918.
(Addressed Foreign, repeated to Secretary of State for India.)
(Received 15th January, 11 a.ra.)
[P.] 385. On return from short absence 1 find several telegrams from
Philby, certain of which I think I should repeat:—
“No. M. 20 of 8th January. General attitude of this side seems against
encouraging or helping Bin Sand to attack flail; first, because Hamilton’s
report, reinforced by strong and obviously prejudiced representations by
King’s sons, have caused keen alarm aDout possibility of Wahhabi militant ^
revival, vide Arab Bulletin No. 74 ; secondly, because it is feared that Bin
Sand’s secret purpose is to attack King, and that he might do that
successfully, bringing to nothing all that has been done to secure British
influence in Islamic world through our influence with King ; and thirdly,
because to some extent it is regarded as desirable not to eliminate Bin
Rashid, who might serve as useful counterpoise in future rivalry of King
and Bin Sand, though this point is not seriously pressed. _ It is fully
realised that only possible military objective of Bin Saud is Hail, and
that he cannot undertake it without assistance proposed, while it _ is also
realised that main object of Najd mission was to study situation with that
end in view, but it is argued that recent successes Palestine and weakening
of Wady Haifa position in 1 ledjaz necessitate reconsideration of our plans
regarding Hail.
“ While fully realising Najd operations must be subordinated to general
scheme, both military and political, I must point out that intimation of
abortion of mission will be extensively prejudicial to our interests and
prestige in Najd, and will put an end to intimate relations established by
Shakespear in spite of Wahhabi prejudice in [.f], especially as such decision
will be taken as based primarily on our engagements with King of Hecljaz,
between whom and Bin Sand it is idle to pretend that there is slightest
vestige of real cordiality.
“ We cannot compel them to be friends, but we can very effectively
compel them to respect each others territorial integrity by withdrawing
subsidies or threatening sea-ports, and in case of Bin Sand, the valuable
Province of Hasa. Best means of securing reasonable modus vnemU
between them is, in my opinion, to recognise Bin Sand s natural claims to
Hail and if he succeeds in capturing it, his rule m whole of Central Arabia
east of line to be fixed between it and Hedjaz. To encourage King to hope
for suzerainty over Bin Saud or to attempt to persuade latter m any way to
accept such position will only embitter relations further.
“ At the same time I deprecate attaching too much importance to
Wahhabi possibilities. The Akhwan should be regarded as constituting
standing army Bin Saud is perfectly justified in maintaining, just as King
does and will maintain regular force. Total number of Akhwan at present
does not in my opinion exceed 10,000 or 12,000 men in all, and Bin mnn
could raise twice or thrice this number if able to arm and pay them ^
“ Finally capture of Hail would be serious blow to lurkish piestige, and
might hasten conclusion of hostilities in Hedjaz. I submit, therefore m
would be great pity to forego chance either because it does not suit King.
book or because it raises fears of possible \\ ahhabi ambitions 1118 ’
therefore that question will be considered as at time of Missions depaitme
from sole standpoint of our general military requirements, l urks are by no
means done with yet, however excellent our present prospects are, and any
blow likely to increase their troubles should not be lightly foregone.
“ In any case time presses if operations are to be undertaken this season.
1 Trust decision will be arrived at early. .
“ Have given Hogarth copy of above for information.