File 522/1922 Pt 5 'Persian Gulf: Bahrein: Administration: Internal Affairs: British Interference' [‎62r] (134/356)

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so in'the"futuie““ uml lrom so doing in tiiepast, and would not do
7 C u “ ,c uue uommumenis m administration, and we should have
equal! y to accept the commitments for defence if Bahrain were threatened Indeed
I am separately suggesting it as a Naval base and the headquarters of our squadron
in the Persian Gult. ^
59. The objections to a Protectorate are purely political, they are no longer
administrative. But Shaikh Hamad knows that he cannot stand without us, and
indeed I would say that notwithstanding his personal outlook, he is content to keep
us there for tnat reason. His state of mind is a mixed one to be swayed either way
by the course of events. At present, though turning towards Ibn Saud, in his per
sonal feelings, he looks towards us and has no desire for the rigid strictness of Wahabi
rule.
60. I would suggest then that Shaikh Hamad should be induced to approach us
saying that he fears the political situation, and would be glad if we would extend
to him the protection which was refused to his predecessor in 1849.
With the consolidation of our position we could afford to cut down the British
staff to one man, and insist that Shaikh Hamad should make all the show of ruler-
ship, as in an Indian State, since our position would be unassailable except by
force.
61. The Protectorate thus concluded need not be proclaimed for the moment,
if it is not desired, but it would legalise and consolidate a position which is loose
and uncertain. I cannot, personally, face with equanimity a future based on the
present circumstances of world politics, especially of Eastern politics, and the con
ditions under which we are now tolerated in Bahrain, conditions which with the
advance of the Wahabi power, might, in place of a willing subordination, become a
forcible bond founded on no right with a hostile people in open sympathy with an
advancing Islamic power.
62. We are losing our position in the Northern coast of the Gulf; we shall
equally lose it in the Southern if we allow Bin Saud to consolidate his power on the
whole Southern littoral.
A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty’s Minister, Tehran.
MC531FD—25—17-9-27—GIPS.