Coll 28/65 ‘Persia. Perso-Soviet Commercial Relations.’ [‎12r] (24/482)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY
EASTERN (Persia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
0^ HIS BRITAN NIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
T
Section 3.
E 7486/3126/34 Copy No. J
Sir H. Seymour to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 14.)
(No. 346.)
My Lord, Tehran, October 29, 1939.
THERE is little of interest to report about the attitude of the Iranian
Government towards the war. From the Iranian point of view the policy of
Russia is for the moment the one thing that matters, and I feel reasonably sure
that the Soviet Government have not yet given any definite indication of their
intentions, or whether their policy towards this country is to be modified.
2 . The Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation yesterday asked me
whether I had any news I could give him about probable Russian moves in Asia.
I said that I had not, and suggested that so far the Russians seemed to be mainly
concerned with re-establishing their influence in the European areas which had
been Russian before 1918, and with strengthening their position in respect of
Germany. I added that I had noticed the references to Russia in the Shah’s
Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Majlis (my telegram No. 166 of
the 28th October), and asked what significance was to be attached to them. His
Excellency replied that the Irano-Soviet Commercial Agreement had expired
oyer a year ago, and that the Shah had simply referred to it because the negotia
tions for a new one had hung fire for so long. In referring to the various rumours
of Russian intentions which have circulated in Tehran, "he said that there were
no serious concentrations of Russian forces near the Iranian frontiers; there
had been various troop movements, but these seemed to be mostly in the nature
of transfers of troops between European and Asiatic Russia.
3. There is no doubt that anxiety as to Russian intentions persists, and
naturally so. The Iranian Government fear that the longer the war lasts the
greater will be the opportunities for Russia to follow unchecked any policy in
regard to her weaker neighbours which may appeal to the Kremlin.
4. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that those who represent the
Shah s views see that Hitler’s “ peace offer " afforded no basis for negotiation.
M. Jam (then Prime Minister, now Minister of the Court) told me after the
speech that he thought it the speech of a madman. The Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who is rather found of speculating in general terms, has spoken to me
of what Hitler's position might now be if he had kept the undertaking given
at Munich to settle future questions by peaceful means. If he had done so,
M. A Tam said, he would almost certainly have obtained all that Germany needed’
and would now be one of the most popular figures in the world. These remarks
are, I am aware, of no particular intrinsic interest; but both M. Jam and
M. A Tam are, or were, fairly close to the Shah, and one may suppose that their
views as to Hitler’s responsibility for the war reflect those of His Majesty.
5. The commercial and financial situation of Iran naturally remains
difficult. There is now a tendency to turn to the United States for supplies, and
enquiries are being made there for, among other things, rails, tyres, aeroplanes
and a loan. I am told that the Iranian Government are becoming suspicious of
German assurances that they will be able to continue supplies of machinerv and
other industrial material on a practically undiminished scale.
6 . I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador at
Bagdad, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs
Department, and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.
I have, &c.
H J. SEYMOUB.