Coll 6/4(2) 'Asir: Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.' [‎89v] (185/796)

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ERIC DRUMMOND.
supplied to our Minister by the Saudi Government themselves, even though
agreement over the Najran still presented difficulties. In these ciicumstances,
His Maiesty’s Government, whose only object is to promote peace and stability in
Arabia,' are perturbed to learn that, before the arrival of a telegram despatched
by the Imam on the 9th January, the heir apparent had been ordered to the fror^
as a consequence of some local disturbance and that the Commander-in-chief m
Asir had been instructed to advance. Although the advance of the latter
appears to have been now countermanded, it seems that, as a result of some
misunderstanding on each side as to the intentions of the other, there is a serious
danger of an outbreak of hostilities. His Majesty’s Government accordingly
express the earnest hope that the Saudi Government, who have given so many
proofs of their desire for peace, will do their utmost to avert the irreparable
misfortune of war.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was to be asked to convey this message to
the King, with an assurance that it was inspired by the friendliest motives, and
that His Majesty’s Government were ready to continue to use their good offices to
promote an amicable settlement if the negotiations were continued.
I feel that the Italian Government will appreciate the motives which have
inspired this communication, and that, for their part, they will continue to use
all their influence with the Imam to arrive at a reasonable settlement with Ibn
Baud.
In the circumstances explained above, and for certain other reasons which I
shall proceed to describe, His Majesty’s Government have come to the conclusion
that it would not be desirable to proceed, for the present,, with the proposed
conversations referred to in the Ministry’s note verbale of the 23rd December last,
enclosed in your letter to me of the 29th December. One of the principal grounds
for arriving at this decision has been the fact that, as emphasised in the
Ministry’s note verbale of the 23rd December, as well as in previous corres
pondence on the subject, the points of view of the Italian and British
Governments in regard to (a) the status of Asir, and (b) the Imam’s claim to that
territory, are obviously very far from reconciliation. My Government would, of
course, be quite prepared still further to elaborate their own ideas on the subject
if the Italian Government so desire, but for the moment the question seems to be
to a certain extent academic.
Moreover, while the actual position in South-West Arabia is still admittedly
obscure, it is certain that up to a short time ago great efforts were clearly being
made on both sides to arrive at an agreed settlement without recourse to war. In
these circumstances it seems possible that the proposed conversations might be
misunderstood locally and give rise to rumours which would impede, rather than
facilitate, the peaceful solution of the dispute. *
In any case, my Government would find it difficult at this moment to send out
a suitable expert from London, as the competent Department of the Foreign Office
is extremely hard pressed.
I hope that your Excellency will appreciate the force of the considerations
which I have set forth above. Our two Governments may, and very likely will,
continue to differ in regard to the specific problem of Asir; but I am convinced
that we shall continue to collaborate in regard to the larger question of the
prevention of war, and I have some hope that the last demarche of our Minister,
coupled with any representations which the Italian Government may, for their
part, see fit to take with the Imam, may result in a successful solution of our
difficulties.
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