Coll 6/4(2) 'Asir: Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.' [‎351r] (708/796)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOYERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
September 15, 1933.
to]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[E 5422/759/25]
No. 1.
K
M?\ Calvert to Sir John Simon.—{Received September 15.)
(No. 275.)
Sir, . Jedda, Aug ust 29. 1933.
IN continuation of my despatch No. 273 of to-day’s date and with reference
to my telegram No. 161 of the 24th August, relative to the possibility of the
outbreak of hostilities between King Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen, I
have the honour to report that Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who has been in Jedda
since my meeting with him on the 24th August, yesterday requested a further
interview with me. I accordingly called on him in the afternoon at the Khuzan
Palace.
2. He produced a sheaf of telegrams which, he explained, he had just
received from the Amir Feisal with instructions to read them over to me. I was
not offered copies of these telegrams, as on previous occasions, but perused them,
with the Minister of Finance, sentence by sentence. As the telegrams were six
in number and, of these, four were long and not a little involved, it may be that
the following summary may not be in every respect complete, but I believe, in the
main, the contents of the telegrams, particularly in regard to the more important
points, have been adequately retained.
3. The telegrams were prefaced by a short note, also in the form of a
telegram. It was carefully read by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman and stated that,
from information received in Riyadh, it appeared that Imam Yahya was
mobilising his forces in the Yemen and that therefore Ibn Saud had ordered
the Saudi forces on the north-east of Nejd to proceed to the south-west, i.e., to
Asir, as a reinforcement to the troops already there. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman
here explained that the military forces of Saudi Arabia are divided into three
zones, or commands, the north-western (which had dealt with the Ibn Rifada
rebellion), the north-eastern and the south-western. He described this measure
as a purely precautionary one, and, in reply to a question, informed me that the
orders had been issued three weeks ago. He added that he had heard, but not
officially, that, should the situation deteriorate and the use of force become
inevitable, Amir Saud, the King’s eldest son, would probably be appointed to
command the troops operating in Asir. He was unaware whether the troops
of the North-Eastern t£ Command ” had yet arrived in Asir, but thought not.
4. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman did not enlighten me as to the address to
which this telegram, if telegram it was, had been sent, but I inferred that it
had been sent by the King to Amir Feisal at Taif. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman
then proceeded to read five telegrams, all of which, he informed me, had been
sent by Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya. It would appear, although the Minister of
Finance himself was not clear on the point, that the Imam’s letter to Ibn Saud,
entrusted to the delegation who wirelessed the contents to Riyadh (as reported
in my telegram No. 158 of the 19th August), and to which Ibn Saud replied at
length had, indeed, "elicited a reply from the Imam in which he stated that he
was quite unable to grasp the meaning of Ibn Sand’s telegram or understand
the demands he was putting forward. To this, Ibn Saud rejoined, in the first
of the five telegrams read by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, that, although ho
considered his position perfectly understandable, yet for the sake of clarity he
would put each of his mam points in a separate telegram. In this rather lengthy
introductory telegram he recalled the measure of agreement reached previously
and embodied in the treaty between them, and called attention to the signal
gesture of conciliation, affording proof of his desire for a permanent settlement,
in his action over the Arwa mountains dispute.
5 Of the four telegrams embodying his desiderata, the first dealt with the
Tihamat Asir, a question which Ibn Saud regarded as concerning himself and
the Imam only and one which had been definitely settled by their treaty. The
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