PZ 5749/39(1) 'Propaganda: Articles forwarded to Persian Gulf, Kabul & Katmandu for dissemination' [‎223v] (446/715)

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of Adolf Hitler. And even that must happen at once. The Army
was asking “ Yes ” or “ No,” since the success of its plans depended
largely on the rapid occupation of Poland and the conclusion as soon
as possible of the war on the Eastern front. Bad weather might
otherwise intervene at any time and was likely to prove one of
Poland’s best defences against the highly mechanised German army.
Moreover, a week had already been lost by Herr Hitler’s hesitation
on the 25th August.
57. I have no doubt that such and other considerations were
present in Herr Hitler’s mind on the night of the 80th August. I
was consequently not surprised when I received in the early hours
of the morning of the 81st reliable information that the actual
decision had been taken to order the advance of the German Army
by midday or 1 p.m. if no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived before
then. I believe this information to have been accurate, and I
attribute the further brief respite which ensued to the twelfth-hour
efforts of the Italian Government to restrain Herr Hitler from war.
58. I had in the meantime obtained from another source more
definite, if unauthorised, details of the German proposals, and these
I at once communicated through the Counsellor of His Majesty’s
Embassy to the Polish Ambassador, who spent that morning on the
telephone to Warsaw. About the middle of the day I had transmitted
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a further message from His
Majesty’s Government to the German Government notifying them
that the Polish Government were taking steps to establish contact with
them through the Polish Ambassador at Berlin, and asking them to
agree to an immediate provisional modus vivendi at Danzig, for which
purpose M. Burckhardt was suggested as intermediary. To this
communication I never received any reply. There was, however,
a further delay of some 12 hours. The Polish Government had
authorised their Ambassador to establish contact with Herr von
Ribbentrop, and Herr Hitler waited to see what message M. Lipski
would bring. The question, in fact, was whether his qualifications
would be those of a Plenipotentiary empowered by the Polish Govern
ment to conduct and conclude negotiations or not. On no other
terms was Hitler prepared to postpone action. His army was ready
and Poland must be taught a lesson. She must crawl or get her
whipping.
59. During the day there had been much activity on the part
of Field-Marshal Goring. I think there can be no doubt that Field-
Marshal Goring himself would have preferred a peaceful solution,
but in matters such as these it was Herr Hitler’s decision which
alone counted; and whatever Field-Marshal Goring himself might
feel, he was merely the loyal and submissive servant of his master.
Moreover, he had come down definitely on the side of peace a year
before and it may have been difficult for him to adopt this course a
second time. He invited me, however, to come and see him that