Coll 7/14 'Persia and Persian Gulf: suggested Anglo-Persian Arms Traffic Agreement. Persia and the Arms Traffic Convention' [‎499r] (1008/1190)

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this point tliat leymourtache said something to the etfert thot u i, ,, ,
in 1 -ondon an atmosphere of suspicion against the PeSn Government ^
gave me an opportunity of saying that I was fully aware before f k !?
the atmosphere was not good; 1 had, therefore repreLnted J c * m \ h f re that
Government after I had been here a short time and^here seemed r
k improvement that to my mind a treaty such as we had ,n vTew houldlTthi
, consummation of, rather than the introduction to, good relations ■md T hla n
that the resumption of negotiations be deferred until thetb^^eighbourS
on both sides had eliminated all traces of the past mistrust. I had, however been
over-ruled, largely, I thought, as the result of his visits to London He could
therefore, safely conclude that His Majesty's Government were keenly anxh™
to reach an agreement, leymourtache replied that he did not see that anything
could possibly have been gained by a postponement of the negotiations and asked
how I thought that a spirit of confidence could be created while major issues were
outstanding. I said that I thought there were a number of ways instancing the
joint survey of the Baluchistan frontier, which we could perfectly well have
refused, and from which I rather fancied we had nothing to gain and possibly a
httle to lose and a possible arrangement for dealing with frontier district
rebels in that region. Teymourtache agreed profusely that matters were
easier now, but did not agree that negotiations should have been deferred.
i ^ 1110111 to wonder whether a frontier rectification in
Baluchistan might not provide the necessary “compensation” for Bahrein
though he hastened to sa\ that the East was not the favourite part of the Empire
I told him that I did not know in the least, but anyway it would be quite useless
to make any suggestion if the Persian attitude on the subject of Heniam was a
completely non possumus one, as his language seemed to indicate. As regards
Henjam, I, having lived a good deal in the East, could understand his objections
to a lease, though I doubted whether other people, e.g., the First Lord of the
Admiralty, who was a person of some importance in the councils of His Majesty's
Government, would be able to; but I could not understand, and quite certainly
people m England would not understand, why the Persian Government should
object to affording, in the full exercise of Persia's sovereign rights, the facilities
for wmch we asked in consecration of a treaty of friendship. A refusal of these
facilities would quite inevitably be regarded in England as a signal proof of
unfriendliness and the feeling engendered would render it quite certain that no
turther compensation for Bahrein would be entertained for one moment. In
Lict [ should regard it as a waste of time to try and think of something,
leymourtache replied that though he did not admit that the potential charge of
unfriendliness was justified he quite understood that it would almost inevitably
be made, and he said positively that if Persian national sentiment could be
satisfactorily appeased over Bahrein a settlement regarding Henjam could be
reached. (I hroughout the discussion of Bahrein I was insistent that he wanted
vindow-dressing and nothing else and he did not deny it.)
With regard to Henjam specifically, at one time he talked of the practical
uimculties of meeting our wishes, rather suggesting that they lay in the high
handed attitude adopted by the naval store-keeper there. I gave him recent
instances, i.e., the “ Khuzistan ” and “ Baroda,” to convince him that this was
ver y f ar from being the case and so he reverted to the line that Henjam would
present no serious difficulties, but for the irregular situation in the Gulf which
was a relic of the past and which made Persian opinion particularly sensitive
and, indeed, suspicious. Persia had suffered severely, more especially during the
war. When I said that we had not taken the initiative in violating Persia’s
neutrality he admitted it readily enough, and also admitted that we had at no
ime been guilty of aggressive action against Persia, but said that the effect on
eisian opinion of the abandonment of Persia's interests by the conclusion of the
A nglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 had been just as disastrous as any act of
aggression and created the mistrust which had lasted ever since. I told him that
finite understood all this, but that we were engaged in removing anomalies, and
! 'y.® were successful in removing" them his objections to Henjam seemed to me
t0 disappear. 6
I Throughout the conversation whenever I pressed the discussion of Henjam
tf ?t S ^ nc ^ lne d to switch off to Bahrein as soon as he could, and he kept saying
a be wondered how a settlement over Bahrein could be reached. T reminded
lm em phatically that he had said in London that he foresaw a quick and easy
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