Coll 7/14 'Persia and Persian Gulf: suggested Anglo-Persian Arms Traffic Agreement. Persia and the Arms Traffic Convention' [‎499v] (1009/1190)

agreement. This to my mind could onl} mean, in vie'w of the course of the
previous negotiation and of his knowledge that Hen]am was the one material
thin 0 * we cared about, that he contemplated some ad\ance to meet us. By bis own
admission the withdrawal of Airwavs to the Ai ab coast made matters much easier
for him, but, none the less, there was no advance.
When I asked what we should do next if we failed to reach a settlement bv ^
negotiation, Tevmourtache looked gloomy and evinced a definite dislike to an
appeal to any outside body, saying that if they lost their case opinion in Persia
would take the view that the arbitral body had not regarded the issue as between
the Sheikh of Bahrein and Persia, but as one between the British Empire and
an Asiatic State; it would all make for unpleasantness; but from another aspect
an arbitral decision would, of course, relieve the Persian Government of a
considerable measure of responsibility. At this stage Hen jam once again came
into the discussion, Teymourtache observing that it was a matter which lay
within the undisputed control of the Persian Government. I quite agreed and
said that of course the Minister for Foreign Affairs could address us a note
to-morrow asking us to withdraw. I supposed that we should then burn down
the club-house and canteen, remove the coal-depot and blow up the store-houses
and—Teymourtache added—fill up the well. I suggested that it might be easier
and better to poison it and he quite agreed. Returning to a serious tone I said
that none of this would advance our object, which was to place our relations on
a good workable basis. He again expressed ready agreement and delivered a
little speech on the paramount value to Persia of British friendship.
I said that if he would view the draft treaty as a whole, coupled with the
withdrawal of our request for air facilities, I thought he would find that he could
face public opinion with equanimity. Teymourtache replied that he did not
agree, and said that, though in a sense public opinion in Persia was not a factor
of great importance, it had to be reckoned with, adding, in evidence, that on his
return from Europe he had received from persons who presumably imagined that
he had not been in touch with the course of events quite a number of letters
severely criticising the settlement with Turkey. I said I quite appreciated this,
and realised that even in countries, not excluding Russia, where dictatorships (to
use a convenient word) existed, public opinion could not, for some obscure reason,
be completely disregarded.
At one point I mentioned the Duzdap Railway, saying that this would
constitute a very definite benefit to be derived by Persia from the treaty.
Teymourtache replied that, so far as he "was concerned (though this did not
matter, because it was not the view of the Persian Government), the Duzdap
Railway was of no value to Persia whatsoever. He had been persistent with me
on the subject (see my telegram No. 10 of the 9th February, 1932), because the
Shah, “who liked railways indiscriminately," had manifested a keen interest.
If a treaty went through, the railway would be used bv Persia, but he was quite
clear that it was by no means of importance. It was either at this point or when
talking about the remission of a million of the debt that I said that, if he was not
careful, I should say to him vdiat Sir Austen Chamberlain once had occasion to
sa } German Government. He asked what it was, and I replied that it was
to the effect that once they had obtained a valuable concession they immediately
belittled it as an excuse for asking for more.
Towards the end of the discussion, Teymourtache. who v r as beginning to look
tired, began scribbling on a piece of paper w*hat. when he had finished, he called
all soi ts of nonsense. This nonsense, which he proceeded to read out to us.
Bah. 1 2 3 * * * ' nUm ^ er ^ aZ " T ^ eas on subject of possible “compensation tor
(1) A frontier rectification in Baluchistan.
(2) The payment by His Majesty’s Government to the Persian Government
some portion of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company income tax.
' ^ reduction in the price of military* aeroplanes, wTiich were going to be
bought in London (at one moment he said definitely 7 that they were
ia\ k gom £ k°bought, and later slightlv qualified this statement).
-^ n rmdertaking by His Majesty*’s Government, if at any" time the Persian
Government wished to add to their squadron, which was not their
present intention, to provide the vessels cheap.
(o) .^ome vague undertaking that, if at anv time Persia wnshed to raise a
foreign loan, His Majesty s Government would srive it their blessing-