File 2764/1904 Pt 3 'Baghdad Railway: general negotiations 1910-1912.' [‎142r] (292/544)

[This Docament is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.!
EASTERN DEPARTMENT.
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[January 2.]
SECRET SERIES.
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Section 4.
[48] No. 1.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1911.)
(No. 496. Secret.)
Sir > _ TT . TTT , . 1 1 Petersburg^ December 26, 1910.
1 HAVIj m another despatch recorded the bitter language used by the “ Novoe
Vremya ” in speaking of Austria in connection with the Wassitch trial, which has iust
been concluded at Belgrade.
From the language held to me by the Emperor and from the tone of the Russian
press it would appear that, while His Majesty and the Russian Government have
forgotten and forgiven the humiliation which Germany inflicted on them during the
Balkan crisis of 1908, their feeling ot rancour against Austria, and more especially
against Count Aehrenthal, shows no sign of abatement. M. Isvolsky has doubtless
handed down to his successor a political legacy of profound distrust and dislike
of that statesman, and this fact, coupled with the knowledge that the Emperor
shares this personal resentment, is likely to prevent M. Sazonow attempting to
bring about an Austro-Russian rapprochement so long as the foreign policy of the
Dual Monarchy is controlled by Count Aehrenthal. Were the latter to disappear from
the scene the case might be different, as his retirement would give satisfaction to
Russia’s wounded vanity.
Germany, on the other hand, has also reasons of her own for wishing to see
a more pliable and subservient Minister installed at the Ballplatz, and from the
Chancellor’s recent declarations on German policy in the Near East and from the
violent articles published in the Russian press, it would almost seem that the two
Governments had agreed to open a campaign against his Excellency for the purpose of
discrediting him and encompassing his fall. Should these efforts be crowned with )
success, the way would be prepared for supplementing the Russo-German agreement
respecting Persia and the Bagdad Railway by some kind of an understanding between
Austria and Russia with regard to the Balkans. Were this latter to take the j
form which M. Isvolsky desired to give to the abortive conversations which took place
between St. Petersburgh and Vienna last spring, and w T ere the other Powers
consequently to be invited to subscribe to its provisions, it might serve as a useful
instrument for the maintenance of peace in the Near East. Were it, however, as is not
impossible, to be in the nature of a secret agreement between the two Cabinets, of
which Germany, as Austria’s ally, would alone have cognisance, it might seriously
affect the value of the Triple Entente as a counterpoise to Austro-German ascendency in
Europe.
At the present moment both the Emperor and his Government are, I believe,
sincerely anxious to adhere loyally to their alliance with France and to their under
standing with England; but the course which the present negotiations with Germany
have taken leads me to fear that when it is a question of securing satisfaction for some
particular or immediate interest Russia may drift dangerously far into German waters. H
Nor must it be forgotten that the reactionary party in Russia inclines much more
towards Germany than towards England, while there are not wanting those who are in
favour of being on the side of the big battalions.
M. Sazonow’s desire to prevent Germany poaching in the Russian preserves ;
in North Persia accounts for the haste with which he has made proposals respecting
Persia and the Bagdad Railway without consulting our views or wishes. He was, it is
true, not bound to do so by the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement, but he has
none the less laid himself open to the reproach of not having observed the spirit of the
tacit understanding, according to which no arrangement was to be concluded with
Germany respecting the Bagdad Railway by any one of the parties to the Triple
Entente until the other two had also come to terms with her. The temptation to secure
favourable conditions with regard to North Persia was too strong for him, and he either
drafted or accepted the text of the 1st article of the draft agreement without reflecting
on the difficulties which it might occasion in the future. As an instance of his rather
careless habit of doing business I may mention that, though I informed him the day
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