File 2764/1904 Pt 3 'Baghdad Railway: general negotiations 1910-1912.' [‎172r] (354/544)

[This Document is the Property of Hlg Britannic Majesty's Government,]
BAGDAD RAILWAY. [December 15.]
SECRET. Section 2.
—
.<1 -.I’ U L" / ?
[44998] No. 1.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.
(No. 314. Secret.)
Sir, Foreign Office, December 15, 1910.
COUNT BENCKENDORFF told me to-day that M. Sazonow was personally
favourable to a trans-Persian railway scheme. Count Benckendorff believed that the
other members of the Russian Government were also favourably inclined. But he was
not in a position to commit his Government with regard to the question, and he could
not say anything to me about it officially.
I replied that I was in much the same position. Personally, I was favourable to
the project, and I thought the result of the good understanding between Russia and
us ought to be that the idea of a Russian invasion of India should disappear. The
idea had always seemed to me a somewhat remote one. Nevertheless, if the project of
the railway became a practical one to which we were committed, the first question we
should be asked would be whether all the strategical considerations had been taken
into account. I was going to have these looked into, with a view to overcoming any
objections there might be.
I then pointed out that what had recently passed between M Sazonow and the
German Government respecting the Bagdad Railway had made me see that a new
factor might have to be taken into account. For, if the Bagdad Railway was to be
linked with the trans-Persian Railway, the question would arise whether, in times of
Pan-Islamic excitement it might not be possible for a mass of Turkish-Mahommedan
troops to be precipitated on to the Indian frontier.
Count Benckendorff admitted that this might be a serious consideration; but he
explained that M. Sazonow would not favour a junction between Khanikin and
Ispahan, but only a junction northwards from Khanikin towards Tehran, and the
junction would be made only in the indefinite future.
1 pressed Count Benckendorff as to how M. Sazonow stood with regard to the
Bagdad Railway. I reminded him that our position had been that we were quite
willing that negotiations should take place between Sir Ernest Cassel, for instance, and
Herr Gwinner with the object of securing for us the control of the Bagdad end of the
railway; but we had always been quite explicit in saying that, when we found that
an arrangement satisfactory to us could be made, we should not be able to confirm it
until satisfactory arrangements had been made by Germany with Russia and France.
In other words, negotiations might proceed separately with Germany, but a settlement?
could not be reached until we were all satisfied.
Count Benckendorff said that this was exactly the position of M. Sazonow also.
Both as regards the linking-up with Tehran and the concession of a branch from
Khanikin to Bagdad, Russia was prepared to be satisfied and herself to satisfy
Germany, but she could not accept or make this arrangement until an arrangement
had been come to with us and with France as well about the Bagdad Railway.
Count Benckendorff made it quite clear, in answer to questions, that the branch from
Khanikin to Tehran and from Khanikin to Bagdad were on the same footing in this
respect.
I expressed satisfaction at hearing that this was the position. But, though I
made no observation to Count Benckendorff that would weaken the force of what he
had said to me, I think it necessary to observe to your Excellency that M. Sazonow
has not yet expressed himself so definitely at St. Petersburgh.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
[1821 p-2]